Public–private partnerships (P3s) have emerged as a leading means of structuring large, complex infrastructure projects in both developed and developing economies alike. However, P3s, due to their unique characteristics, can present opportunities for corruption. The purpose of this article is to promote the development of a nuanced and thorough understanding of P3 corruption risks such that those involved in developing, designing, and implementing P3s can more effectively harness the benefits of P3s while mitigating the corruption risks they introduce. This article also seeks to encourage further research into how infrastructure P3s can be better shaped to decrease the probability of corruption risks materializing. This article unpacks how and why P3s, as a distinct form of public procurement, are at once more and less susceptible to corruption as compared with traditional procurement methods and as such deserve special attention from an anticorruption perspective.

The jurisprudence in the area of restraint of trade reveals inconsistencies concerning what falls within the ambit of a restraint of trade. In addition, the modern employment relationship is of a radically different nature than the employment relationships of the past. This article reviews the historical approach and discusses some recent Canadian jurisprudence on restraint of trade. In light of changes to the employment landscape, this article proposes modifications to the court’s characterization of “restraining” provisions and directs more emphasis towards reasonableness and the interest-balancing process. It concludes with an application of the proposed test for an unreasonable restraint of trade and a defence of the proposed alterations.