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The timely publication of corporate financial information depends on the time taken to complete the audit. The audit report lag is a particularly critical factor in emerging and newly developed capital markets where the audited financial statements in the annual report are the only reliable source of information available to investors. This paper examines the audit report lag of companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange at the time of its transition from an emerging market to a newly developed capital market. A statistically significant association is found between audit report lag and type of auditor, audit fees, number of remarks in the audit report, the presence of extraordinary items, and an expression of uncertainty in the audit report. The results suggest that audit report lag is reduced by appointing an international audit firm or paying a premium audit fee, but is extended by aspects of potentially bad news.

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The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.