Effective and legitimate governance supposedly form a mutually reinforcing relationship, a virtuous circle of governance. We critically explore this argument in the context of limited statehood and underline why such areas challenge key assumptions underpinning the virtuous circle argument. In this special issue we ask: Does the effectiveness of governance affect the legitimacy of governance actors and institutions in areas of limited statehood, and vice versa? We develop a theoretical model of the virtuous circle and show that making such circles work is more complex, demanding and unlikely than often assumed. Empirical studies need to take these complexities into account, and policy makers are well-advised to adjust their policies accordingly.

While it is widely acknowledged that effectiveness and legitimacy both play an important role in the evaluation of governance, the causal relationship between these two concepts is far from clear. While some theorists hold that there is an inevitable trade-off between the demands of effectiveness and legitimacy, others argue that both qualities are mutually reinforcing. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between these two standards under conditions of limited statehood. The paper is organized into three sections: In the first section I will define the central concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy. While the main features of the concept of effectiveness are straightforward, the concept of legitimacy is notoriously opaque. In the second section, I will argue that the causal relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy is far more complex than usually assumed. Most scholars describe the connection as a virtuous circle: The more effective a political order or institution is, the more legitimate it is, and the more legitimate it is, the more effective it becomes. While the causal pathway from legitimacy to effectiveness is well understood, this does not hold true for the reverse connection from effectiveness to legitimacy. I will therefore identify four necessary conditions which have to be met in order to make the virtuous circle argument compelling.These are the conditions of (1.) "instrumental legitimacy belief," (2.) "shared social goals," (3.) "transparency," and (4.) "generalization". Finally, I will argue that these conditions are serious challenges to effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood. ZusammenfassungIn der Governance-Literatur ist es nahezu unumstritten, dass der Erfolg oder Misserfolg eines Governance-Regimes an seiner Effektivität und Legitimität gemessen werden kann.

The essays collected in this special issue explore what legitimacy means for actors and institutions that do not function like traditional states but nevertheless wield significant power in the global realm. They are connected by the idea that the specific purposes of non-state actors and the contexts in which they operate shape what it means for them to be legitimate and so shape the standards of justification that they have to meet. In this introduction, we develop this guiding methodology further and show how the special issue's individual contributions apply it to their cases. In the first section, we provide a sketch of our purpose-dependent theory of legitimacy beyond the state. We then highlight two features of the institutional context beyond the state that set it apart from the domestic case: problems of feasibility and the structure of international law.

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The state was long seen as the only institution able to govern legitimately. The empirical limitations of statehood in many parts of the world, as well as the normative ambivalences inherent to statehood, however, have led to a renewed interest in the legitimacy of non-state governance. A prominent approach holds that non-state governance is legitimate if and to the extent that it contributes to normatively desirable outcomes, such as an increase in security. This chapter argues that this approach faces four problems that severely limited the scope of legitimate governance by non-state actors in areas of limited statehood. They concern the definition of goods, the inclusiveness of governance services, the accountability of non-state actors, and the reliable assignment of responsibilities. We contend that these problems highlight the need for public institutions and explore whether and how non-state actors can assume public roles under conditions of limited statehood.