Endorsement of educational psychological misconceptions among preservice teachers can be a threat for reaching educational goals. Therefore, it is of societal interest whether preservice teachers hold educational psychological misconceptions and, if they do, whether these misconceptions can be reduced through confrontation with empirical evidence. Prevalence and refutability of misconceptions were analyzed among N = 937 German preservice teachers who participated in an online survey. Results indicated a high prevalence of educational psychological misconceptions but also the possibility of a reduction through refutation-style texts. However, only few preservice teachers shifted their opinions from (rather) endorsing a misconception to (rather) not endorsing it after reading the text. We conclude that educational psychological misconceptions are common among German preservice teachers and that merely presenting empirical evidence is insufficient to effectively counteract misconceptions. Future research should deepen the understanding of why and wherefrom these misconceptions occur and develop efficient interventions to counteract misconceptions among preservice teachers.

Abstract. Previous research has found a high prevalence of some (educational) psychological misconceptions (i.e., incorrect but often popular assumptions that contradict results from psychological research) among (pre-service) teachers. However, the number of topics that have been investigated is limited. Additionally, knowing the sources of misconceptions might be helpful for rebutting them. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence has been found to be important for informing (pre-service) teachers' practice, but personal experiences also are among the main sources of misconceptions. Therefore, we hypothesized that pre-service teachers would predominantly view sources of anecdotal evidence as the origin of their educational psychological beliefs in general and the main source of their misconceptions in particular. In an online survey (with correlational and quasi-experimental elements) of N = 836 pre-service teachers, we found that educational psychological misconceptions were less prevalent than expected but that pre-service teachers indeed mainly based their beliefs on sources of anecdotal evidence (personal experiences and narratives from other people) and that these nonscientific sources turned out to be the main sources of their misconceptions (comparison with scientific sources: d = 0.19 and d = 0.23). Furthermore, referring more to sources of anecdotal than scientific evidence (research and lectures) was associated with undesirable aspects, that is, more misconceptions ( d = 0.21) and less reduction of misconception endorsement through empirical refutation-style information ( d = 0.30) but not with a lower judgment of the view that it is possible to examine educational psychological topics scientifically. In sum, our results indicate that basing one's beliefs more on sources of anecdotal than scientific evidence is associated with outcomes that stand in contrast to evidence-based education. Future research should investigate why pre-service teachers concentrate on sources of anecdotal evidence, how to make sources of scientific evidence more tempting, and whether counteracting misconceptions by showing the downside of nonscientific sources is effective.

Psychological misconceptions can be a threat for reaching educational goals and should consequently be prevented. In this study, we analyzed different methods to combat psychological misconceptions: We contrasted a standard lecture with a refutation lecture, and tested the effects of a short intervention educating about cognitive biases and imparting strategies to evaluate information analytically. Prevalence of and reduction in 18 educational psychological misconceptions as well as enhancement of metacognitive monitoring accuracy regarding these misconceptions were analyzed among N = 266 German preservice teachers who participated in online surveys at the beginning and the end of one semester. Results indicated a high prevalence of diverse misconceptions (11 misconceptions were endorsed by more than 50% of preservice teachers at t1). The refutation lecture led to a strong reduction in refuted misconceptions, with an unexpected spill-over effect on misconceptions that were not addressed. The standard lecture resulted in a smaller reduction in the targeted misconceptions only, whereas imparting information evaluation strategies showed no effects on misconception reduction. For metacognitive monitoring accuracy, we found analogous results. Based on these results and a follow-up survey half a year later, we conclude that educational psychological misconceptions are widespread among preservice teachers and that refutations in psychology lectures are an effective approach to counteract specific misconceptions with enduring effects. Thus, our results-which could be replicated with other psychological misconceptions and student populations-have implications for both psychology researchers and instructors who aim to reduce psychological misconceptions.

Abstract. To guide their professional practice, (pre-service) teachers consider information from a variety of sources. One prerequisite for source preference is the extent to which a source is considered as expert, integer, and benevolent (i.e., its ascribed epistemic trustworthiness). Recent research indicates that pre-service teachers ascribe more expertise but less integrity and benevolence to educational researchers than to practitioners ( Merk & Rosman, 2019 ). However, whether this so-called “smart but evil” stereotype holds true for different epistemic aims is still unknown. In a study with N = 389 pre-service teachers, we analyzed (a) which overarching epistemic aims (i.e., to understand educational research vs. to gather practical knowledge) pre-service teachers have when entering university courses in educational psychology, (b) whether they ascribe higher expertise but lower integrity and benevolence to educational psychology researchers as compared to teachers (i.e., the “smart but evil” stereotype), but also (c) whether these trustworthiness ratings differ for different epistemic aims, and (d) whether pre-service teachers' ascriptions of epistemic trustworthiness to researchers are associated with their perceived usefulness of educational research for teaching practice. We used a within-subject design, asking participants to rate the epistemic trustworthiness of educational psychology researchers versus teachers for two epistemic aims (explanations vs. practical advice). In short, the results only partially support a “smart but evil” interpretation; they show that trustworthiness ratings are in fact adapted to epistemic aims. Hence, our results show that different epistemic aims influence how the trustworthiness of an information source is evaluated.