In this article, we advance research on transparency by developing and validating a measure based on recent theoretical insights about its dimensionality. We find that transparency—defined as the perceived quality of information—is a three-dimensional construct consisting of perceived information disclosure, clarity, and accuracy. Evidence shows items associated with these dimensions can be aggregated into a single transparency construct. We also find that transparency (as an aggregate construct) is distinct from neighboring constructs such as informational justice and capable of predicting perceptions of the source’s trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, and integrity). Finally, we find evidence of measurement invariance between two commonly used referents of analysis, yielding confidence in the application of the proposed measure across research settings. We discuss implications of the new measure for research on transparency, the extension of the new measure to related research traditions, and the practical application of the new measure for managers interested in constructing and appraising transparent messages.

In this research, we examine the dynamic capability of resource allocation to invest in operational capabilities. Using a computer simulation, we model a process of firms competing in factor markets for opportunities to invest in existing capabilities and acquire new ones. Based on the simulation results, we derive a set of propositions about the conditions under which there are and are not performance benefits from possessing a superior ability to search for new capabilities. Because the definition of what constitutes a new capability is based on a firm's preexisting capabilities, we also incorporate differences in initial endowments into the analysis. We find that endowment and search ability both matter, and that in many circumstances, the effects of possessing a superior endowment dominate the effects of superior search ability.

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In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of policies for assigning interdependent workers to teams. Using a computational simulation, we contrast distributing workers equitably across teams based on prior individual performance with policies that distribute workers based on how well people work together. First, we test a policy that clusters workers into teams by finding natural breakpoints among them where their mutual support is weak. Then we test two other policies that both protect the strongest interdependent core of high performers but differ in that one policy separates workers who give little support to interdependent partners and the other separates workers who receive little support from their partners. All three policies outperform the equitable-distribution approach in some circumstances. We make recommendations to managers for harnessing interdependence when forming teams, whether the managers are familiar or unfamiliar with how well their people work together.