We investigate whether corporations and their executives react to an exogenous change in passive institutional ownership and alter their corporate governance structure. We find that exogenous increases in passive ownership lead to increases in CEO power and fewer new independent director appointments. Consistent with these changes not being beneficial for shareholders, we observe negative announcement returns to the appointments of new independent directors. We also show that firms carry out worse mergers and acquisitions after exogenous increases in passive ownership. These results suggest that the changed ownership structure causes higher agency costs.

We investigate the role of physical distance in corporate lending by exploiting infrastructure improvements as shocks to travel time. Lower travel time increases the likelihood of initiating a new banking relationship, consistent with an economic surplus from lower transaction costs. In existing lending relationships, banks capture part of this surplus by increasing interest rates, in particular, if banks have higher bargaining power. Reductions in travel time to competing banks have the opposite effects. Banks benefit from improved infrastructure through an increase in clients, and lenders that rely more on technology do not exhibit sensitivity to changes in distance. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance.

No abstract

No abstract