Saudi Arabia provides a compelling example of how sectarianism sustains the dynamics of authoritarianism, especially when bolstered by a rentier political economy. In this paper, I investigate three claims about the link between Saudi authoritarianism and sectarianism, as follows: (1) Governing with a sectarian ideology impedes political reform, since it disrupts cross-sectarian reform coalitions by attacking the sectarian outgroup. (2) The presence of multiple sects, as well as hydrocarbon wealth, allows regimes like that of al-Saʿud to use divide-and-rule tactics to maintain control; it also enables the funding of media and education outlets with the purpose of perpetuating authoritarianism, especially when the authoritarian dynamics are underpinned by a rentier political economy. (3) Despite the authoritarian and rentier dynamics in play, the Saudi government has at times sought at least a degree of inclusion of the Shia minority, depending on the political economy and the relative influence of Shia and Sunni Islamists. Using the existing literature on the Saudi state and historical examples, I aim to clarify the link between sectarianism and authoritarianism in a state in which the Sunni/Shia division, bolstered by a rentier political economy, has emerged as a powerful means of maintaining the political status quo.

Drawing on contemporary history and empirical research, this article revises traditional rentier state theory, which fails to account for the existence of Islamist movements in states accruing substantial outside wealth. Rentier state theory expects that citizens of such states will form opposition blocs only when their stake in rent income is threatened. Examining the development of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in two archetypal rentier states, or super-rentiers, in the Gulf—Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—this article shows that ideology rather than rent motivated the formation of independent Islamist movements. This research helps to break the causal link established by rentier state theory between oil rents and lack of politically relevant Islamist organizations. We find that the presence of oil rents, instead of rendering Islamist complaint politically irrelevant, shapes the ways in which Islamist movements seek to influence government policies.

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This book, using contemporary history and original empirical research, updates traditional rentier state theory, which largely fails to account for the existence of Islamist movements, by demonstrating the political capital held by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While rentier state theory predicts that citizens of such states will form opposition blocs only when their stake in rent income is threatened, this book demonstrates that ideology, rather than rent, has motivated the formation of independent Islamist movements in the wealthiest states of the region. It argues for this thesis by chronicling the history of the Brotherhood in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, and showing how the organization adapted to the changing (and often adverse) political environs of those respective countries to remain a popular and influential force for social, educational, and political change in the region. The presence of oil rents, then, far from rendering Islamist complaint politically irrelevant, shapes the ways in which Islamist movements seek to influence government policies.