The chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms announcing layoffs receive 22.8% more total pay in the subsequent year than other CEOs. The pay increases result almost entirely from increases in stock-based compensation and are found to persist. In addition, layoff announcements are accompanied by shareholder value increases averaging $40 million to $95 million. One-time labor cost savings from layoffs average $65 million. We conclude that CEOs receive pay increases following layoffs as rewards for past decisions and to motivate value-enhancing decisions in the future. Copyright 2007, The Eastern Finance Association.

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CEOs with higher equity-based compensation are widely believed to be more likely to act in shareholders' interests. Unlike less common acquisitions, voluntary liquidations, or seasoned equity offerings, layoffs are comparatively common elements of firms' operating strategies. We find that CEOs with at least one year of tenure who possess greater incentives from portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants are more likely to announce layoffs, and that these layoffs create shareholder value. We conclude that accumulated portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants encourage CEOs to adopt operating strategies that improve operating profits and stock performance. 2007 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

"This paper investigates the evolution of corporate governance and firm performance in transition economies. It focuses on barriers that impeded adoption of optimal corporate governance at Czech ammunition manufacturer Sellier and Bellot (S&B) following voucher privatisation in 1993. Exogenously imposed diffuse ownership, combined with legal, capital market, and accounting deficiencies, contributed to poor corporate governance and weak firm performance. This study shows how legal, capital market, and accounting deficiencies hinder corporate governance evolution; it demonstrates monitoring and incentive mechanisms can create value in transition economies; it suggests effective privatisation not only involves rapid ownership transfer but careful accounting and securities regulation and legal protection." Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to describe lessons learned from integrating student-managed investment funds (SMIFs) in finance education systems based on the case of the Raymond Rebsamen Investment Fund at the Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas. Design/methodology/approach The paper has three main parts. First, it describes how the Rebsamen Fund operates as an integral part of undergraduate and graduate finance education at the Walton College. Second, it explains how the Fund spawned creation of sister funds, an institute, a 62-seat trading center, and coordinates with other agencies and stakeholders. Third, it lists strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing future SMIF integration into finance education. Findings The use of innovative experiential learning solutions like SMIFs bridging theory and practice can be enhanced by integrating them into effective systems of finance education. Practical implications Lessons learned include benefits of SMIF management by class, licensing and professional certification, trading centers, use of SMIF finances to support other components of education, proliferation of SMIFs, SMIF stimulation of academic units like centers/institutes, SMIF facilitation of collaboration, importance of tying SMIFs to student finance clubs, coordination of industry speaker visits between SMIF classes and clubs, and use of SMIFs in addressing cutting-edge challenges. Originality/value This paper discusses how SMIFs can be integrated in finance education.