The relationship between the self and the collective is discussed from the perspective of self-categorization theory. Self-categorization theory makes a basic distinction between personal and social identity as different levels of self-categorization. It shows how the emergent properties of group processes can be explained in terms of a shift in self perception from personal to social identity. It also elucidates how self-categorization varies with the social context. It argues that self-categorizing is inherently variable, fluid, and context dependent, as sedf-categories are social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference. This notion has major implications for accepted ways of thinking about the self: The variability of self-categorizing provides the perceiver with behavioral and cognitive flexibility and ensures that cognition is always shaped by the social context in which it takes place.

In this article the authors explore the social psychological processes underpinning sustainable commitment to a social or political cause. Drawing on recent developments in the collective action, identity formation, and social norm literatures, they advance a new model to understand sustainable commitment to action. The normative alignment model suggests that one solution to promoting ongoing commitment to collective action lies in crafting a social identity with a relevant pattern of norms for emotion, efficacy, and action. Rather than viewing group emotion, collective efficacy, and action as group products, the authors conceptualize norms about these as contributing to a dynamic system of meaning, which can shape ongoing commitment to a cause. By exploring emotion, efficacy, and action as group norms, it allows scholars to reenergize the theoretical connections between collective identification and subjective meaning but also allows for a fresh perspective on complex questions of causality.

Social psychology has much to say about conditions under which people will take action to overcome their own, or another group's, disadvantage. Starting with Le Bon's (1895/1947) analysis of crowd behavior, social psychologists have explored the psychological motivators and processes underpinning collective action for over a century (for reviews see Haslam, 2001; Klandermans, 1997). This paper focuses on two recent developments in that tradition that emphasize a central role of social identity. Specifically, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) have recently conducted an integrative meta-analysis of collective action research, yielding what van Zomeren et al. (2008) call the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA). Thomas, McGarty, and Mavor (2009a) proposed an alternative complementary role for social identity in the encapsulation model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA). This paper provides direct empirical tests of SIMCA and EMSICA with some new twists. Both models afford a central role to the function of social identities in promoting collective action.

Research on group identification has shown it to be a surprisingly weak predictor of intentions to take large-scale social action. The weak links may exist because researchers have not always examined identification with the type of group that is most relevant for predicting action. Our focus in two studies (one in Romania and one in Australia, both Ns ¼ 101) was on opinion-based groups (i.e. groups formed around shared opinions). We found that social identification with opinion-based groups was an excellent predictor of political behavioural intentions, particularly when items measuring identity certainty were included. The results provide clear evidence of the role of social identity constructs for predicting commitment to social action and complement analyses of politicised collective identity and crowd behaviour.

This article explores the synergies between recent developments in the social identity of helping, and advantaged groups' prosocial emotion. The authors review the literature on the potential of guilt, sympathy, and outrage to transform advantaged groups' apathy into positive action. They place this research into a novel framework by exploring the ways these emotions shape group processes to produce action strategies that emphasize either social cohesion or social change. These prosocial emotions have a critical but underrecognized role in creating contexts of in-group inclusion or exclusion, shaping normative content and meaning, and informing group interests. Furthermore, these distinctions provide a useful way of differentiating commonly discussed emotions. The authors conclude that the most "effective" emotion will depend on the context of the inequality but that outrage seems particularly likely to productively shape group processes and social change outcomes.