Background Our aim was to estimate provisional willingness to receive a coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine, identify predictive socio-demographic factors, and, principally, determine potential causes in order to guide information provision. Methods A non-probability online survey was conducted (24th September−17th October 2020) with 5,114 UK adults, quota sampled to match the population for age, gender, ethnicity, income, and region. The Oxford COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy scale assessed intent to take an approved vaccine. Structural equation modelling estimated explanatory factor relationships. Results 71.7% (n=3,667) were willing to be vaccinated, 16.6% (n=849) were very unsure, and 11.7% (n=598) were strongly hesitant. An excellent model fit (RMSEA=0.05/CFI=0.97/TLI=0.97), explaining 86% of variance in hesitancy, was provided by beliefs about the collective importance, efficacy, side-effects, and speed of development of a COVID-19 vaccine. A second model, with reasonable fit (RMSEA=0.03/CFI=0.93/TLI=0.92), explaining 32% of variance, highlighted two higher-order explanatory factors: ‘excessive mistrust’ (r=0.51), including conspiracy beliefs, negative views of doctors, and need for chaos, and ‘positive healthcare experiences’ (r=−0.48), including supportive doctor interactions and good NHS care. Hesitancy was associated with younger age, female gender, lower income, and ethnicity, but socio-demographic information explained little variance (9.8%). Hesitancy was associated with lower adherence to social distancing guidelines. Conclusions COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is relatively evenly spread across the population. Willingness to take a vaccine is closely bound to recognition of the collective importance. Vaccine public information that highlights prosocial benefits may be especially effective. Factors such as conspiracy beliefs that foster mistrust and erode social cohesion will lower vaccine up-take.

of the political information being consumed, which limits its potential to increase political knowledge. (2) The consumption of political information through social media increases cross-cutting exposure, which has a range of positive effects on civic engagement, political moderation, and the quality of democratic politics, but also facilitates the spread of misinformation. (3) Political exchanges on social media sites are frequently negative and uncivil, which contributes to the rise in affective polarization.

Background The effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccination programme depends on mass participation: the greater the number of people vaccinated, the less risk to the population. Concise, persuasive messaging is crucial, particularly given substantial levels of vaccine hesitancy in the UK. Our aim was to test which types of written information about COVID-19 vaccination, in addition to a statement of efficacy and safety, might increase vaccine acceptance. Methods For this single-blind, parallel-group, randomised controlled trial, we aimed to recruit 15 000 adults in the UK, who were quota sampled to be representative. Participants were randomly assigned equally across ten information conditions stratified by level of vaccine acceptance (willing, doubtful, or strongly hesitant). The control information condition comprised the safety and effectiveness statement taken from the UK National Health Service website; the remaining conditions addressed collective benefit, personal benefit, seriousness of the pandemic, and safety concerns. After online provision of vaccination information, participants completed the Oxford COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy Scale (outcome measure; score range 7–35) and the Oxford Vaccine Confidence and Complacency Scale (mediation measure). The primary outcome was willingness to be vaccinated. Participants were analysed in the groups they were allocated. p values were adjusted for multiple comparisons. The study was registered with ISRCTN, ISRCTN37254291. Findings From Jan 19 to Feb 5, 2021, 15 014 adults were recruited. Vaccine hesitancy had reduced from 26·9% the previous year to 16·9%, so recruitment was extended to Feb 18 to recruit 3841 additional vaccine-hesitant adults. 12 463 (66·1%) participants were classified as willing, 2932 (15·6%) as doubtful, and 3460 (18·4%) as strongly hesitant (ie, report that they will avoid being vaccinated for as long as possible or will never get vaccinated). Information conditions did not alter COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in those willing or doubtful (adjusted p values >0·70). In those strongly hesitant, COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy was reduced, in comparison to the control condition, by personal benefit information (mean difference –1·49, 95% CI –2·16 to –0·82; adjusted p=0·0015), directly addressing safety concerns about speed of development (−0·91, –1·58 to –0·23; adjusted p=0·0261), and a combination of all information (−0·86, –1·53 to –0·18; adjusted p=0·0313). In those strongly hesitant, provision of personal benefit information reduced hesitancy to a greater extent than provision of information on the collective benefit of not personally getting ill (−0·97, 95% CI –1·64 to –0·30; adjusted p=0·0165) or the collective benefit of not transmitting the virus (−1·01, –1·68 to –0·35; adjusted p=0·0150). Ethnicity and gender were found to moderate information condition outcomes. Interpretation In the approximately 10% of the population who are strongly hesitant ...

Artificial Intelligence (AI) now enables the mass creation of what have become known as “deepfakes”: synthetic videos that closely resemble real videos. Integrating theories about the power of visual communication and the role played by uncertainty in undermining trust in public discourse, we explain the likely contribution of deepfakes to online disinformation. Administering novel experimental treatments to a large representative sample of the United Kingdom population allowed us to compare people’s evaluations of deepfakes. We find that people are more likely to feel uncertain than to be misled by deepfakes, but this resulting uncertainty, in turn, reduces trust in news on social media. We conclude that deepfakes may contribute toward generalized indeterminacy and cynicism, further intensifying recent challenges to online civic culture in democratic societies.