The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the likelihood that a company will receive a qualified audit report (as a measure of the quality of financial information) and the existence and characteristics of the audit committee (AC). For listed companies that voluntarily created an AC in the period following the publication in 1998 of the Spanish Code of Corporate Governance, known as the Olivencia Code, we find that ACs size, the percentage of independent members in ACs, company size, losses reported in either or both of the previous two years, receiving the same qualified audit opinion as in the previous year and ownership concentration affect the likelihood of receiving error or non-compliance qualifications. However, the existence of an AC and its composition are not factors associated with the receipt of audit reports containing uncertainties or scope limitations, while losses reported in either or both of the previous two years and receiving the same qualified opinion as in the previous year are. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

In this study, we attempt empirically to investigate the relationship between audit quality and the probability that a financially distressed company would receive a going-concern opinion. Auditor decision-making in the presence of going-concern uncertainties may be characterized as a two-stage process. The first stage is the identification of a potential going-concern problem and the second stage is to determine whether the particular company should receive a qualified going-concern opinion. A sample of 1,199 non-financial Spanish company-years has been obtained from the database issued by the Stock Exchange National Commission for the fiscal years ending between December 1991 and December 2000. The results indicate that audit quality (measured by the auditor's level of independence and knowledge) affects the probability that a financially distressed company would receive a going-concern opinion. This probability is influenced not only by the auditor's ability to detect financial uncertainties, but also by the auditor's decision-making as to what type of opinion should be finally issued.

This paper explores the necessary and sufficient conditions of good Corporate Governance practices for high risk disclosure by firms in their Corporate Governance Annual Report. Additionally, we explore whether those recipes have changed during the financial crisis. With a sample of 271 Spanish listed companies, we applied fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to a database of financial and non-financial data. We report that Board of Directors independence, size, level of activity and gender diversity, CEO duality, Audit Committee independence, being audited by the Big Four auditing firms and the presence of institutional investors are associated with high risk disclosure. The conditions included in almost every combination are the presence of institutional investors and being audited by the Big Four. We found similar combinations for 2006 and 2012, while the analysis for 2009 showed the lowest number of causal configurations.KEYWORDS | Board composition, corporate governance, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, independent director, risk disclosure. RESUMO O presente artigo investiga as condições necessárias e suficientes das boas práticas de Governança RAE-Revista de Administração de Empresas | FGV/EAESP

This meta-analysis takes stock of 121 C.E.O. pay studies published between 1998 and 2018 with the objective of identifying the main drivers of C.E.O. pay from a global perspective and contributing to the agency vs managerial debate on this ground. The meta-results disclose a positive C.E.O. pay-performance correlation (the highest correlation coefficient corresponds to Earnings per share with a 34%) as the agency theory prescribes and the governance policies promote. However, firm size still predominates as the main driver of C.E.O. pay (correlation coefficient is around 44%) according to managerial premises. Moreover, our results reconcile both approaches because results of the meta-regressions suggest that larger companies and more independent boards strengthen the pay-performance association. Additional analyses of moderating factors on C.E.O. pay forces do not provide robust conclusions, though, they suggest: (1) weak impact, if any, of both the Cadbury Report and the S.O.X.; and (2) lack of homogeneity in the banking industry despite its specific regulation. ARTICLE HISTORY

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