Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the industry relatedness of directors’ multiple directorships and corporate governance effectiveness. The authors posit that a director gains “beneficial experience” by serving on outside boards of companies in related industries, with a resulting increase in governance effectiveness. Conversely, they predict a decrease in governance effectiveness when directors serve on outside boards of companies in unrelated industries.
Design/methodology/approach
– Using publicly available data, a Tobit regression model is used to examine the effect of the industry relatedness of board members’ multiple directorships on corporate governance effectiveness.
Findings
– The results demonstrate a significant positive correlation between the industry relatedness of directors’ multiple directorships and corporate governance effectiveness. It was found that this industry relatedness effect is stronger for directors of small companies than large company directors. The paper also documents a significant negative effect on governance effectiveness for small firms whose directors increase their board service on non-industry-related boards.
Originality/value
– Prior research has examined the “Busyness Hypothesis” and the “Experience Hypothesis” as mutually exclusive hypotheses. This paper extends prior research by examining the possibility that the two hypotheses are not competing, but rather that both an experience effect and a busyness effect may be present for directors serving on multiple boards, and that one of the effects will dominate the other, based on certain company-specific characteristics.
In this paper, we critically examine three situations in the accounting/auditing profession in which conflicts of interest arise. Specifically, we describe conflicts of interest that occur (1) because audit fees are paid by the very companies being audited, (2) due to the tension built into accountants codes of professional ethics between the responsibility to maintain client confidentiality and the need to serve the public trust, and (3) because of most auditors perspective of who is their primary client. Based on our analysis, we conclude that these three inherent conflicts of interest, in the absence of some unforeseen revolutionary changes, are likely to persist within the auditing profession. We also conclude that attempts to mitigate some of these conflicts of interest through the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation have only been moderately successful. We therefore propose that audit professionals must learn to identify and manage the conflicts of interest that will likely remain a part of the profession for the indefinite future.
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