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This Article provides theoretical and empirical support for the claim that organized crime competes with the state to provide property rights enforcement and protection services. Drawing on extensive data from Japan, this Article shows tha4 like firms in regulated environments everywhere, the structure and activities of organized criminal firms are significantly shaped by statesupplied institutions Carefid observation reveals that in Japan, the activities of organized criminal firms closely track inefficiencies in formal legal structures, including both inefficient substantive laws and a state-induced shortage of legal professionals and other rights-enforcement agents. Thus organized crime in Japan-and, by extension, in other countries where significant gaps exist between formal property rights structures and state enforcement capacities-is the dark side of private ordering. Regression analyses show negative correlations between membership in Japanese organized criminal firms and (a) civil cases, (b) bankruptcies (c) reported crimes, and (d) loans outstanding. Professors Milhaupt and West interpret these data to support considerable anecdotal evidence that members of organized criminal firms in Japan play an active entrepreneurial role in substituting for state-supplied enforcement mechanisms and other public services in such areas as dispute mediation, bankruptcy and debt collection, (unorganized) crime control, and finance They offer additional empirical evidence indicating that arrests of gang members do not curb the growth of organized criminal firm Their findings may have a significant normative implication for transition economies: efforts to eradicate organized crime should focus on the alteration of institutional incentive structures and the stimulation of competing rights-enforcement agents rather than on traditional crime-control activities Organized crime is flourishing. It thrives in transition economies, it persists in developed nations; it prospers under globalization. Criminal groups may control 40 percent of the Russian economy, for example.! In Japan, the influence of organized crime extends from prostitution to golf course development, from banking and securities

Literature suggests two distinct paths to stock market development: an approach based on legal protections for investors, and an approach based on self-regulation of listed companies by stock exchanges. This paper traces China's attempts to pursue both approaches, while focusing on the role of the stock exchanges as regulators. Specifically, the paper examines a fascinating but unstudied aspect of Chinese securities regulationpublic criticism of listed companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Based on both event study methodology and extensive interviews of market actors, we find that the criticisms have significant effects on listed companies and their executives. We evaluate the role of public criticisms in China's evolving scheme of securities regulation, contributing to several strands of research on the role of the media in corporate governance, the use of shaming sanctions in corporate governance, and the importance of informal mechanisms in supporting China's economic growth.