Current tobacco control strategies seek primarily to decrease the demand for cigarettes through measures that encourage individuals to adopt healthier behaviours. These measures are impeded and undermined by tobacco corporations, whose profit drive compels them to seek to maintain and expand cigarette sales. Tobacco corporations seek to expand cigarette sales because they are for-profit business corporations and are obliged under law to maximise profits, even when this results in harm to others. It is not legally possible for a for-profit corporation to relinquish its responsibility to make profits or for it to temper this obligation with responsibilities to support health. Tobacco could be supplied through other non-profit enterprises. The elimination of profit driven behaviour from the supply of tobacco would enhance the ability of public health authorities to reduce tobacco use. Future tobacco control strategies can seek to transform the tobacco market from one occupied by for-profit corporations to one where tobacco is supplied by institutions that share a health mandate and will help to reduce smoking and smoking related disease and death.

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Although governments have imposed controls on tobacco company behaviour, they have not yet aligned tobacco industry goals to public health objectives. As a result, tobacco companies have delayed or diminished the impact of imposed public health measures and have not contributed to curbing the epidemic of tobacco use. Over the past decade, several regulatory innovations have been proposed as ways to better align industry actions with public health needs, but none have been put in place. These policy suggestions share the goal of providing a supply-side complement to conventional demand reduction strategies, but they differ in the assumptions they make and in the regulatory and governance approaches they take. Similarly, differing views on ideology and political context within the tobacco control community and between governments may hinder the establishment of a global consensus on the ideal supply-side intervention. A government willing to implement innovative supply-side strategies as part of a tobacco control endgame may not require such consensus if factors specific to their national public health systems or political contexts are supportive.

The business of selling cigarettes is increasingly concentrated in the hands of five tobacco companies that collectively control almost 90% of the world's cigarette market, four of which are publicly traded corporations. The economic activities of these cigarette manufacturers can be monitored through their reports to shareholders and other public documents. Reports for 2008 show that the revenues of these five companies exceeded $300 billion, of which more than $160 billion was provided to governments as taxes, and that corporate earnings of the four publicly traded companies were over $25 billion, of which $14 billion was retained after corporate income taxes were paid. By contrast, funding for domestic and international tobacco control is not reliably reported. Estimated funding for global tobacco control in 2008, at $240 million, is significantly lower than resources provided to address other high-mortality global health challenges. Tobacco control has not yet benefited from the innovative finance mechanisms that are in place for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The Framework Convention On Tobacco Control (FCTC) process could be used to redirect some of the earnings from transnational tobacco sales to fund FCTC implementation or other global health efforts.