Scholars from multiple fields have shown increasing interest in the causes and consequences of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Although this proliferation of research has the potential to significantly improve our understanding of M&A activity, absent is the necessary step of consolidating and integrating extant knowledge. Accordingly, this article develops a framework to organize and review recent empirical findings, principally from management, economics, and finance in which interest in acquisition behavior is high but also from other areas that have tangentially explored acquisition activity such as accounting and sociology. This article identifies patterns and theoretical gaps and provides recommendations for future research aimed at developing a more integrated M&A research agenda for management scientists.

The failure to document a consistent and robust relationship between executive pay and firm performance has frustrated scholars and practitioners for over three quarters of a century. Although recent compensation research has revealed alternative theoretical frameworks and findings that hold the potential to significantly improve our understanding of executive compensation, to date this diverse literature lacks theoretical integration. Accordingly, we develop a framework to organize and review these recent findings. We further identify methodological issues and concerns, discuss the implications of these concerns, and provide recommendations for future research aimed at developing a more integrated research agenda.

We thank Senior Editor Sim Sitkin and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions. We also gratefully acknowledge helpful suggestions from Adrienne Colella,

We examine the influence of CEO equity-based compensation on strategic risk taking by the firm. Building off the Behavioral Agency Model, Agency Theory, and Prospect Theory, we develop arguments about when equity-based compensation elements will increase or decrease executive risk propensity and, in turn, strategic risk taking. Incorporating a behavioral perspective into our models of incentive alignment provides us with new and potentially more accurate predictions about how individual elements of CEO pay will influence risk selection, as well as how equity compensation interacts with cash compensation and with other factors to influence risk preferences. In general, this study provides evidence that CEO equity-based compensation significantly influences strategic risk, but that this influence is more nuanced and complex than conventional treatments of executive compensation assume. In particular, we find that different forms of equity-based pay exhibit dissimilar influences on strategic risk and that their influence changes as their value and vesting status change. Second, we find that cash-based forms of pay moderate the incentive properties of equity-based pay, indicating that cash-based pay may affect how executives perceive risks associated with equity pay. Finally, we find that stock price volatility and board actions each also moderate the incentive effects of equity-based pay. In sum, our results argue for increased recognition of a behavioral perspective on executive compensation and greater precision in how we measure and model the incentive alignment properties of CEO compensation.

The authors review management research drawing on prospect theory, focusing primarily on studies in strategic management and organizational behavior/human resource management. These studies have made valuable contributions to several prominent research streams. However, they commonly underutilize or misconstrue central arguments from prospect theory. Furthermore, they illustrate that applying prospect theory in organizational settings poses several theoretical and methodological challenges. Thus, the authors review these studies, critically analyze them, and make suggestions to enrich future work.