he most straightforward measure of legislative independence from interest group pressure is the rigor of the state's formal JL regulation of lobbyists. State registration and reporting requirements for lobbyists were cited by the Citizen Conference on State Legislatures (CCSL) as important criteria for both legislative independence and accountability (CCSL 1971b: 96, 97, 129, 130). The extent to which legislators resist inordinate interest group pressure is undoubtedly influenced by a whole host of factors, many of them intangible. However, the legislature's formal adoption of laws regulating lobbies and the oversight structure put into place to enforce these laws are important indicators of the institutional desire for independence. The CCSL maintains that &dquo;the very least that legislatures must do to establish their independence of undue influence-both in substance and in the eyes of the public-is make certain that lobbyists operate out in the open, where the press and public can see them&dquo; (CCSL 1971b: 129).The adoption of lobby regulation laws in the states has been a lengthy and gradual process; the first law was passed by Massachusetts in 1890. Addressing charges of corruption, over half the states in the 1960s and 1970s introduced lobby registration and reporting requirements. Today lobbyists must register in all states-with the secretary of state, the clerk of the house or secretary of the senate, or with a special commission. In all but five states, lobbyists must file reports periodically, and in four-fifths of the states they must report expenditures (Rosenthal 1981: 117). In addition, more stringent lobby regulation reforms have been introduced at the federal level and in several state legislatures.State legislatures and agencies charged with enforcement of lobbying regulations have traditionally been notorious for their neglect of both oversight and enforcement. This neglect has been precipitated by

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This article explores what forces shape the careers of women and African American legislators, focusing on two key stages in the process: the election to state legislatures and the election to the US House of Representatives. We further consider the impact of that process on the maintenance of the political class in the US. Our findings suggest that African American members get elected when there are enough African American voters to elect them. State houses provide a nice starting point because the districts tend to be small allowing for a number of majority minority districts. But, at each successive step, i.e., the state senate and the US House, other factors enter the process. As districts get larger and the stakes get higher, it seems that success also becomes dependent on the number of African American politicians primed to move up by having experience serving in the preceding body. The pattern for women is less predictable with cultural variables and opportunity structure playing a role. The supply of candidates is the one variable common to women and African Americans. We conclude that the process is in many ways similar to that for white males and facilitates the stability of the political class.