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This article asks under what circumstances controversial technologies would be considered seriously for remediation instead of being rejected out of hand. To address this question, the authors developed a conceptual framework called public acceptability of controversial technologies (PACT). PACT considers site-specific, decision-oriented dialogues among the individuals and groups involved in selecting or recommending hazardous waste remediation technologies. It distinguishes technology acceptability, that is, a willingness to consider seriously, from technology acceptance, the decision to deploy. The framework integrates four dimensions: (1) an acceptability continuum that underlies decision-oriented dialogues among individuals and constituency groups, (2) the attributes of these individuals and groups, (3) the attributes of the technology at issue, and (4) the community context—social, institutional, and physical. This article describes and explores PACT as a tool for understanding and better predicting the acceptability of controversial technologies.

The importance of social and institutional issues in the siting of nuclear waste facilities has been recognized in recent years. Limited evidence from a survey of rural Wisconsin residents in 1980 indicates that incentives may help achieve the twin goals of increasing local support and decreasing local opposition to nosting nuclear waste facilities. Incentives are classified according to functional categories (i.e., mitigation, compensation, and reward) and the conditions which may be prerequisites to the use of incentives are outlined (i,e., guarantee of public health and safety, some measure of local control, and a legiti mation of negotiations during siting). Criteria for evaluating the utility of incentives in nuclear waste repository siting are developed. Incentive packages may be more useful than single incentives, and non monetary incentives, such as independent monitoring and access to credi ble information, may be as important in eliciting support as monetary incentives. Without careful attention to prerequisites in the siting process it is not likely that incentives will facilitate the siting process. vi LIST OF TABLES Fa"orability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives ... 9 Distribution of. persons who changed their position to accept a waste repository in their community by type of incentive package Distribution of the acceptance of incentives to site a nuclear waste repository among Wisconsin residents .... Distribution of persons who changed their position to accept a waste repository in their community by type of incentive package Favorability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives by selected demographic and social characteristics Favorability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives by community setting v11

Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool-like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

Factors that shape actual research practices - 'social and institutional context' - typically are missing from considerations of synthetic biology R&D-related risk and containment. We argue that analyzing context is essential in identifying circumstances that create, amplify, or diminish risk, and in revealing new opportunities for avoiding or managing those risks.