This article examines how power influences behavior. Elevated power is associated with increased rewards and freedom and thereby activates approach-related tendencies. Reduced power is associated with increased threat, punishment, and social constraint and thereby activates inhibition-related tendencies. The authors derive predictions from recent theorizing about approach and inhibition and review relevant evidence. Specifically, power is associated with (a) positive affect, (b) attention to rewards, (c) automatic information processing, and (d) disinhibited behavior. In contrast, reduced power is associated with (a) negative affect; (b) attention to threat, punishment, others' interests, and those features of the self that are relevant to others' goals; (c) controlled information processing; and (d) inhibited social behavior. The potential moderators and consequences of these power-related behavioral patterns are discussed.

Drawing on an appraisal-tendency framework (J. S. Lerner & D. Keltner, 2000), the authors predicted and found that fear and anger have opposite effects on risk perception. Whereas fearful people expressed pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices, angry people expressed optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices. These opposing patterns emerged for naturally occurring and experimentally induced fear and anger. Moreover, estimates of angry people more closely resembled those of happy people than those of fearful people. Consistent with predictions, appraisal tendencies accounted for these effects: Appraisals of certainty and control moderated and (in the case of control) mediated the emotion effects. As a complement to studies that link affective valence to judgment outcomes, the present studies highlight multiple benefits of studying specific emotions. Judgment and decision research has begun to incorporate affect into what was once an almost exclusively cognitive field (for discussion,

Most theories of affective in¯uences on judgement and choice take a valencebased approach, contrasting the effects of positive versus negative feeling states. These approaches have not speci® ed if and when distinct emotions of the same valence have different effects on judgement. In this article, we propose a model of emotion-speci® c in¯uences on judgement and choice. We posit that each emotion is de® ned by a tendency to perceive new events and objects in ways that are consistent with the original cognitive-appraisal dimensions of the emotion. To pit the valence and appraisal-tendency approaches against one another, we present a study that addresses whether two emotions of the same valence but differing appraisalsÐ anger and fearÐ relate in different ways to risk perception. Consistent with the appraisaltendency hypothesis, fearful people made pessimistic judgements of future events whereas angry people made optimistic judgements. In the Discussion we expand the proposed model and review evidence supporting two social moderators of appraisal-tendency processes.

In this paper we present a prototype approach to awe. We suggest that two appraisals are central and are present in all clear cases of awe: perceived vastness, and a need for accommodation, defined as an inability to assimilate an experience into current mental structures. Five additional appraisals account for variation in the hedonic tone of awe experiences: threat, beauty, exceptional ability, virtue, and the supernatural. We derive this perspective from a review of what has been written about awe in religion, philosophy, sociology, and psychology, and then we apply this perspective to an analysis of awe and related states such as admiration, elevation, and the epiphanic experience.In the upper reaches of pleasure and on the boundary of fear is a little studied emotionÐawe. Awe is felt about diverse events and objects, from waterfalls to childbirth to scenes of devastation. Awe is central to the experience of religion, politics, nature, and art. Fleeting and rare, experiences of awe can change the course of a life in profound and permanent ways. Yet the field of emotion research is almost silent with respect to awe. Few emotion theorists consider awe in their taxonomies and those who do have done little to differentiate it from other states.In this paper we offer a conceptual approach to awe. To do so we first review what has been written about awe outside of psychology, which turns out to be significant and illuminating. This literature review identifies two themes that are central to aweÐthat the stimulus is vast and that it requires accommodationÐas

What is compassion? And how did it evolve? In this review, we integrate three evolutionary arguments that converge on the hypothesis that compassion evolved as a distinct affective experience whose primary function is to facilitate cooperation and protection of the weak and those who suffer. Our empirical review reveals compassion to have distinct appraisal processes attuned to undeserved suffering, distinct signaling behavior related to caregiving patterns of touch, posture, and vocalization, and a phenomenological experience and physiological response that orients the individual to social approach. This response profile of compassion differs from those of distress, sadness, and love, suggesting that compassion is indeed a distinct emotion. We conclude by considering how compassion shapes moral judgment and action, how it varies across different cultures, and how it may engage specific patterns of neural activation, as well as emerging directions of research. KeywordsCompassion; Empathy; Sympathy; Prosocial Behavior; Altruism Compassion is controversial. Within studies of morality, theoretical claims about compassion reach contrasting conclusions: some theorists consider compassion to be an unreliable guide to judgments about right and wrong, whereas others view compassion as a source of principled moral judgment (Haidt, 2003;Nussbaum, 1996Nussbaum, , 2001. Within debates about the nature of altruism, researchers have sought to document that a brief state like compassion is a proximal determinant of prosocial behavior (Batson & Shaw, 1991;Hoffman, 1981). Within evolutionist thought, controversies have swirled around whether compassion and sympathy are the products of evolutionary processes, as Darwin assumed, or tendencies too costly for the self to align with the tenets of evolutionary theory (Cronin, 1991).These debates highlight the question that motivates the present review: What is compassion? Ironically, despite pervasive theoretical claims and numerous studies of a state-like episode of compassion, it is largely absent from traditional emotion taxonomies and research (e.g., Boucher & Brandt, 1981;Ekman, 1999;Izard, 1977;Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990;Smith & Ellsworth, 1985;Tomkins, 1984; for an exception, see Lazarus, 1991). Instead, compassion has been described as a vicarious experience of another's distress (e.g., Ekman, 2003;Hoffman, 1981), a blend of sadness and love (e.g. Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor, 1987), or as a Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jennifer L. Goetz, McCardell Bicentennial Hall, Psychology Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753. jgoetz@middlebury.edu. Jennifer Goetz is now at Middlebury College. Publisher's Disclaimer:The following manuscript is the final accepted manuscript. It has not been subjected to the final copyediting, fact-checking, and proofreading required for formal publication. It is not the definitive, publisher-authenticated version. The American Psychological Association and its Council of Editors disclaim ...