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Safety and security risks are usually analyzed independently, by different people using different tools. Consequently, the system analyst may fail to realize cyber attacks as a contributing factor to safety impacts or, on the contrary, design overly secure systems that will compromise the performance of critical operations. This paper presents a methodology for visualizing and assessing security risks by means of bow-tie diagrams, which are commonly used within safety assessments. We outline how malicious activities, random failures, security countermeasures and safety barriers can be visualized using a common graphical notation and propose a method for quantifying risks based on threat likelihood and consequence severity. The methodology is demonstrated using a case study from maritime communication. Our main conclusion is that adding security concepts to the bow-ties is a promising approach, since this is a notation that high-risk industries are already familiar with. However, their advantage as easy-to-grasp visual models should be maintained, hence complexity needs to be kept low.

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An important benefit of performance-based contracts is a better risk and profit-sharing mechanism and by that a means to overcome the "split incentive" problem in current shipping contracts. "Split incentive" means that the risk or cost of implementing beneficial measures does not fall on the same party that gets the benefits. However, performance-based contracts do not come without challenges. These are related to defining commonly agreed performance measurements and an incentive scheme that can counteract problems like allocative efficiency and information asymmetry. This paper gives an example of how these challenges can be addressed by using the Shipping KPI standard. The purpose of the paper is to show how a standard set of key performance indicator definitions and corresponding benchmark values can greatly simplify the design of a performance-based contracts scheme by providing well-defined references for both owner and manager. This is done by creating a bonus and penalty scheme where the payment is related to a single variable (budget performance), while a number of quality indicators control whether a bonus will be paid at all. The paper will discuss this principle in relationship to problems identified in literature on performancebased contracting and ship management and provide an overview of possible strengths and weaknesses.

The prospect of large-scale international adoption of autonomous ships has led to expectations of reduced costs and emissions for waterborne transport of goods. This is commonly attributed to the possibility of removing manning from the ship, which enables more efficient ship designs and reduced operational costs. So why have we not seen a multitude of autonomous ship building projects? There are several reasons for this, including immature technology and regulations. However, there is another reason which has received less attention; the lack of quantifiable evidence for the benefits arising from investing in autonomous ships. There are some case studies on the impact of autonomy on transport cost, but there is no established method for evaluating the effects of an investment in autonomous ships. This paper will present Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) developed to enable such quantification. Furthermore, the developed KPIs are chosen not only to enable quantification of benefits but also to be calculable based on data which it is reasonable to assume that are available or obtainable at a concept stage.