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India and Australia held a set of largely divergent strategic perspectives during the Cold War period, which prevented any significant strategic relationship from developing at that time. Since the end of the Cold War, however, strategic relations between the two countries, although still volatile, have steadily improved. This article argues that as the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly seen as an arena of strategic importance in both New Delhi and Canberra, there is increased scope for a further convergence of Indo-Australian strategic relations based on a series of shared core security concerns. However, in the context of a rising China and re-assertive US in the region, there is a danger that bilateral relations between each of the two countries and the US may serve to prevent a strengthening of independent Indo-Australian relations. First, the post-World War II security policies of both India and Australia are outlined, as are the places occupied by each country in the strategic perspectives of the other. Then, the post-Cold War convergence of security perspectives of both nations is examined in the context of the emerging importance of the Indo-Pacific region in terms of both non-state security challenges and traditional balance-of-power concerns. Finally, the pressures exacted on potential Indo-Australian strategic relations by a rising China and re-assertive US are considered. It is argued that although convergence has begun, India and Australia still have a long way to go before they can initiate a robust and independent bilateral security partnership.

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India currently faces a security dilemma specifically because of the rise of China, Russia’s strategic convergence with China, and the US’s indeterminate Indo-Pacific policy stance. To overcome this dilemma, India’s shift from non-alignment to strategic autonomy poses several questions about its future strategic orientation, notably: Will India enter into a formal alliance with the USA, will India continue to engage China, will India retain close historical relations with Russia or will it more robustly pursue its ‘Act East’ policy? This article attempts a critical analysis of the different strategic options available to India and argues that while entering into a quasi-alliance with the USA, it will retain its strategic autonomy. India could simultaneously retain relations with Russia, China and the ASEAN. However, to the extent possible, its tendency will be to support a multipolar-Asia paradigm rather than a zero-sum alliance system to play a leading role in international fora.

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