Implemented post Piper Alpha, HSE Cases have become a crucial document for demonstrating the adequacy of the management of Major Accident Hazards (MAH). However whilst serving the needs of Regulators and Company Auditors, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the value they add to Operations personnel even when translated from "Design Cases" to "Operations Cases". A survey amongst Asia Pacific OIM's yielded common concerns with the current Cases, independent of asset type and operating area (including Regulatory environment), among them:Lack of transparency between daily operations and a Case that "sits on a shelf".Change management.Difficulty in easily understanding/comprehending major hazards.Unwieldy documents that are a "catch-all" for any Health, Safety, or Environmental related issue.Remedial actions that are seldom closed. A closely related issue is Technical Integrity on aging platforms and the tolerability of equipment state with HSE Cases that don't provide any tangible/practical guidance on 'acceptability' of barriers. To address these concerns Shell Exploration & Production Asia-Pacific (Shell EPA) is implementing a program to "Operationalise" HSE Cases. At the core of the program is the objective to refocus HSE Cases on Major Hazards and provide a roadmap to Company systems (centered on Technical Integrity) that will provide effective barriers during the operational phase. No element of the program is 'revolutionary' but in its entirety provides a cohesive and transparent means of communicating Major Hazards to Operations personnel and providing them a tool to demonstrate that they have the right systems in place to maintain barriers. The Cases are highly focused on Operator's needs, and draws in global best practice from within the Company and Industry. This paper outlines the issues leading up to revamp of Cases, framing of the program and core issues, selected way forward on Case content, elements required for success, and roll-out/accountability requirements. 1. Brief Introduction to HSE Cases The mandatory use of Safety Cases was brought into law for offshore installations in UK waters in the early 1990's. This was a direct result of findings from the Cullen Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 where 167 people lost their lives as the consequence of an explosion and subsequent fire. The original intent of Safety Cases was as a demonstration that a Company had appropriately controlled Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) on an installation, and reduced the risks that arise from them down to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels. Additionally Cases were used to demonstrated that a HSE Management System (HSE-MS) was in place and that correct provisions for escape, refuge, evacuation ad rescue was provided. Other countries have followed the lead of the UK and since adopted the Safety Case approach. Uptake of comprehensive mandatory Safety Case requirements in Asia Pacific has been slower (with notable exception of Australia and New Zealand), although this is increasing with more AP countries incorporating Case requirements into their Health and Safety laws. Many international oil and gas Operators have adopted the concept as good practice and implemented Cases irrespective of (the lack of) legal requirements. Safety Cases have evolved over time to include health and environment (and sometimes security) hazards and are more commonly termed "HSE Cases". They are also routinely applied in other activities such as drilling as well as onshore facilities, pipelines etc. The focus of this paper is on offshore production installations and assumes some familiarity with HSE Case use.

The maximum level of process safety performance an operational asset can attain is indelibly set in the early stages of a project; this is why it is crucial to lay a solid foundation for process safety during design. Despite ever improving design codes and standards, the hydrocarbon industry continues to suffer from major process safety incidents, with incident root causes far too commonly traced back to decisions or actions taken years before during the design stage of a project. Construction safety standards and practices are also long-standing and maturing, but it was the adoption of behaviour-based site-safety campaigns that have allowed selected projects to realise a step-change in incident reduction beyond that offered by systems and practice; achieving world-breaking records of personnel safety. Before embarking on Front-End Engineering Design (FEED), the world-scale Al Karaana Petrochemicals Projecti asked, ‘is it possible to translate the concept of a behavioural-based site-safety programme into a process safety design context?’ To answer this question, a Behaviour-Based Process Safety Programme was created and then piloted with the aim to entrench process safety into the hearts and minds of design engineers, and positively influence behaviours. The cornerstone of this programme is the 9 Foundations of Projects Process Safety, which serve as clear anchor points around which the key messages on process safety are communicated during the Project's FEED. The 9 Foundations of Projects Process Safety are not intended to create any new ‘rules’, but are aimed to help focus on changing behaviours in critical areas where weaknesses are observed in projects. This paper offers observations on framing, developing and then embedding the Behaviour-Based Process Safety Programme for a design-office audience. It records the learning on success as well as improvement opportunities and outlines the intended path forward for subsequent project phases.

fax 01-972-952-9435. AbstractImplemented post Piper Alpha, HSE Cases have become a crucial document for demonstrating the adequacy of the management of Major Accident Hazards (MAH). However whilst serving the needs of Regulators and Company Auditors, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the value they add to Operations personnel even when translated from "Design Cases" to "Operations Cases".