The offshore outsourcing introduces serious threats to semiconductor suppliers and integrated circuit(IC) users for the possibility of hardware trojans (HTs). To alleviate this threat, IC designers use the active defenses against HTs which are implanted by the malicious manufacturer. In this paper, a gametheoretic framework based on fuzzy theory is proposed to obtain the optimal strategy. It analyzes the interactions between the active defense designer and the malicious manufacturer. The attack and defense on IC is formulated as a noncooperative dynamic game. The active defense strategy is decided in IC design. And the overall payoff including design costs and losses avoided is optimized. Subsequently, the HT is implanted considering the implantation cost as well as the damage caused by it. To solve the problem of uncertain payoff caused by insufficient information, fuzzy variable is used to represent the influence of the defense coverage rate on the payoff. In order to verify the applicability of fuzzy variable in dynamic game framework, the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game is proved. A solution algorithm for pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is proposed to obtain the optimal strategy of attacker and defender. Thanks to the case study of Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), the proposed framework is feasible for HT attack and defense game.
Due to wide application of FPGA devices, which are easy to be attacked by HTs, it has been risen up more concern on chip security. In order to ensure the efficiency of detection, side-channel analysis is used to detect HTs. However, existing methods for HT detection cannot detect the LHTs with the small size, which takes up lower than 1% area of the whole chip, considering that signal of LHTs is drowned in process deviations. To complete the side-channel analysis for LHT, we proposed an algorithm that combines PCA and Mahalanobis distance to improve the accuracy of LHTs detection. In addition, performed on FPGA of Xilinx, a sample of LHTs was designed and verified, which took up nearly 0.1% area of the whole chip. The influence of process deviation on the power consumption of FPGA was simulated by Hspice. A set of power-frequency data of golden FPGA was generated by Matlab as panel data, which was considering the influence. Another two sets of FPGA with and without LHT were generated to test the accuracy of the proposed method. For LHT and golden FPGA, the detection accuracy of proposed method is 99% and 87%, respectively. KEYWORDS detection methods, hardware security, hardware trojans, side-channel analysis INTRODUCTIONWith the increasingly complex design of integrated circuits, the cost of manufacturing is becoming higher, and integrated circuits industry is developing toward global cooperation. Due to the outsourced fabrication, assembly, and testing, the security of integrated circuits is facing a new challenge, which is the emergence of HTs. They are stealthy malicious modifications on the original circuits. 1An HT is composed of trigger and payload circuit. The trigger circuit determines the condition when HT is activated. 2 When HT is activated, payload circuit causes functional tampering, downgrade performance, leakage information, or denial of service problem. 3 Frey and Yu concluded that, as the development of HT design, it will be more difficult to detect them. 4 A wireless bypass hardware Trojan is designed by Jin and Makris for the first time in a digital analog hybrid circuit based on the analog characteristics of the wireless channel, such as amplitude, frequency, and phase.This hardware realized depth concealment. 5 Zhang and Xu proposed a systematic hardware Trojan design and implementation methodology, which makes the HT not only hard to trigger but also easy to evade existing detection techniques based on 'unused circuit identification ' . 6 Existing efforts on HT detection can be divided into destructive and nondestructive methods. The destructive method is mainly based on cutting molding coat to reveal the circuit, using SEM to observe the surfaces while grinding the layers of the chip, comparing the image to origin circuit in order to examine the fingerprint. 7 For the chips with simple structure, the destructive method is more suitable. The cost and time consumption of detection will be huge when the structure of chips is complex. The nondestructive detection methods include functional t...
The globalization of integrated circuit (IC) design and fabrication has given rise to severe concerns with respect to modeling strategic interaction between malicious attackers and Hardware Trojan (HT) defenders using game theory. The quantitative assessment of attacker actions has made the game very challenging. In this paper, a novel rough set theory framework is proposed to analyze HT threat. The problem is formulated as an attribute weight calculation and element assessment in an information system without decision attributes. The proposed method introduces information content in the rough set that allows calculation of the weight of both core attributes and non-core attributes. For quantitative assessment, the HT threat is characterized by the closeness coefficient. In order to allow HT defenders to use fast and effective countermeasures, a threat classification method based on the k-means algorithm is proposed, and the Best Workspace Prediction (BWP) index is used to determine the number of clusters. Statistical tests were performed on the benchmark circuits in Trust-hub in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique for assessing HT threat. Compared with k-means, equidistant division-based k-means, and k-means++, our method shows a significant improvement in both cluster accuracy and running time.
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