In seeking to understand IMF lending early large sample econometric studies tended to focus on economic factors. Political and institutional influences were often deemed to be reflected in the frequently large residual. At the same time increasing anecdotal evidence was being amassed to suggest that political factors were indeed important. However, more recent studies have claimed that, by using superior estimating techniques, a satisfactory explanation of Fund lending can be provided without needing to include political and institutional factors, which are in any case difficult to measure and model. This study shows that there is large sample evidence supporting the importance of some of these variables, though their contribution to predicting the pattern of IMF agreements is minimal. It goes on to discuss some of the implications of this for the Fund as the world's premier international financial institution. The research upon which this paper is based was supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). While this support is gratefully acknowledged, the views and opinions expressed are those of the authors alone. Thanks to Chris Worswick and two anonymous referees for comments, and Connie Tulus and Helgi Maki for research assistance.

It has frequently been assumed that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays an important catalysing role in mobilizing international capital for developing countries and countries in transition. The Fund has conventionally been depicted as a "gatekeeper" that unlocks financial flows from other sources, particularly private international capital markets. However, more recently, international financial crises have highlighted the problem of capital volatility and have led to calls for reform of the international financial architecture and, as part of this, the IMF. Unfortunately, basic questions about the interaction between current institutional arrangements and international capital markets have yet to be answered. How do international capital markets react to the activities of the IMF? Do the reactions of private and public lenders differ? Have their reactions changed over time? Do market responses depend on country characteristics and on the type of IMF involvement and, if so, how? This paper addresses these questions and goes on to discuss the policy implications that arise.

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Increasing attention is being paid to political economy dimensions of the IMF's operations. However, up until now, the literature has lacked a systematic overview of how politics and economics interact in this context. This paper sets out to fill the gap. Its conceptual basis is that of the ‘life cycle’ of an IMF programme. What determines the decision to turn to the Fund for financial assistance, what determines the outcome of negotiations, what determines whether a country will come back to the Fund? Answers to these questions cannot be satisfactorily given by examining economics alone. The paper draws on existing evidence to provide an empirically based discussion of the issues involved. It also points the direction in which future research needs to go. Some of the policy implications of the analysis are also examined.

Using an LIC-specific participation model, we adopt a propensity score matching (PSM) methodology to compare economic growth performance in countries with and without IMF programmes over the period 1989-2008. Concessional programmes are found to have had a generally positive effect on economic growth for up to two years after agreements were signed. The effects are contingent on other factors including overall initial economic conditions, recent prior growth performance, aid dependency, debt, IMF resources, recent history of IMF engagement and time period. We examine the implications of the results as the IMF considers how best to support the Sustainable Development Goals.