a b s t r a c tIntentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of 'intention' in neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action. We suggest reinterpreting the mechanisms underlying intentional action, and we will discuss the elements that such a reinterpretation needs to account for.

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Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for communicating research findings, but they are even more impressive as tools for scientific reasoning. Focusing on circadian rhythm research in biology to explore these roles, we examine diagrammatic formats that have been devised (a) to identify and illuminate circadian phenomena and (b) to develop and modify mechanistic explanations of these phenomena. Prevalence and importance of diagrams in biologyIf you walk into a talk and do not know beforehand whether it is a philosophy or biology talk, a glance at the speaker's slides will provide the answer. Philosophers favor text, whereas biologists shoehorn multiple images and diagrams into most of their slides. Likewise, if you attend a philosophy reading group or a biology journal club you can readily identify a major difference. Instead of verbally laying out the argument of the paper under study, the presenter in a journal club conveys hypotheses, methods, and results largely by working through diagrams from the paper. This reflects a more fundamental contrast between philosophers and biologists: their affinity for text versus diagrams is not just a matter of how they communicate once their work is done, but shapes every stage of inquiry. Whereas philosophers construct, evaluate, and revise arguments, and in doing so construct and revise sentences that convey the arguments, biologists seek to characterize phenomena in nature and to discover the mechanisms responsible for them. Diagrams are essential tools for biologists as they put forward, evaluate, and revise their accounts of phenomena and mechanisms. Diagrams play these roles in science more generally, but we have chosen to focus on biology -in particular, on the research topic of circadian rhythms -to begin to get traction on this understudied aspect of the scientific process. Circadian rhythms are oscillations in organisms with an approximately 24--hour cycle (circa = about + dies = day). They are endogenously generated but entrained to the day--night cycle in specific locales at different times of the year. They have been identified in numerous organisms-not only animals but also plants, fungi, and even cyanobacteria-and characterize a vast array of physiological processes (e.g., basic metabolism and body temperature) and behaviors (e.g., locomotion, sleep, and responding to stimuli). Diagrams and mechanistic explanationDiagrams play a central role in biology because they are highly suited to two key tasks: (1) displaying phenomena at various levels of detail, and (2) constructing mechanistic explanations for those phenomena., Philosophers of biology have increased their attention

Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction. A growing literature in philosophy of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation. ‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition. They then infer from the failure of decomposition to the failure of mechanistic explanation and reduction. I argue that complexity, so construed, is only incompatible with one notion of decomposition, which I call ‘atomism’, and not with decomposition writ large. Atomism posits that function ascriptions must be made to parts with minimal reference to the surrounding system. Complexity does indeed falsify atomism, but I contend that there is a weaker, ‘contextualist’ notion of decomposition that is fully compatible with the properties that holists cite. Contextualism suggests that the function of parts can shift with external context, and that interactions with other parts might help determine their context-appropriate functions. This still admits of functional decomposition within a given context. I will give examples based on the notion of oscillatory multiplexing in systems neuroscience. If contextualism is feasible, then holist inferences are faulty—one cannot infer from the presence of complexity to the failure of decomposition, mechanism, and reductionism. 1Introduction2Atomism3Holist Inferences in Detail4Contextualism as an Alternative5Multiplexing and Contextualist Decomposition 5.1Internal dynamics5.2Dynamic interaction5.3Network dependence6Philosophical Upshot 6.1The scope and limits of mechanistic explanation6.2The context objection to reduction7Conclusion