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Abstract. This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I introduce the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology and illustrate how it can enrich the more abstract ontological framework of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism. In the third section of this article I establish in detail the many ways Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. Based on these fundamental differences I show why a criticism leveled against emergentism by the new mechanist philosophy does not hamper my proposed rapprochement between hylomorphism and the new mechanist philosophy. This conclusion, however, leaves untouched the problem I address in the second article, namely, is the new mechanist philosophy compatible with Aristotelian philosophical anthropology's contention that intellectual operations are immaterial and interact with the psychosomatic operations of the rational animal?Keywords: Hylomorphism; Animalism; New Mechanist Philosophy; Neuroscience; Psychology; Philosophical Anthropology; Aristotelianism; Thomas Aquinas; Emergentism.Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism... This essay contributes to these Thomist efforts to resolve certain apparent tensions in THP that concern the interaction of the human person's immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory One potential barrier is related to the rejection of strong emergentism (SE) by proponents of NMP. In the third section ( §III) of this paper, I address why hylomorphic animalism is not a form of strong emergentism. I then draw attention to the similar reasons given by both HMA and NMP for rejecting SE and the Crypto-Cartesian framework that generates it. But this conclusion introduces a new difficulty, for HMA's and NMP's objections to strong emergence seem to apply no less to THP, which maintains that the intellectual powers of any person are immaterial. I take this challenge seriously. In the second article, I address this challenge and other difficulties with the Thomist account of the interaction of noetic and psychosomatic operations. Aristotelian Hylomorphic AnimalismNeo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is the view that all natural substances, cortex, and so forth) in one way that is distinct from the way it animates the bodily organs of the ear, cochlea, auditory cortex, and so forth, which constitute the power of audition. In short, HMA holds that an animal is constituted as a substance by virtue of the soul's abiding organizational animation that pervades the entire organic body. But, the vege...

is a thorough and careful reader of these works, going through the fine details of the arguments in Cicero's Latin texts. While in places this can sometimes become laborious when Cicero has himself been clear enough, on the whole Wynne's meticulous approach is only to be applauded.There are inevitably going to be a few minor points over which one might quibble. For instance, the statement that Stoic lekta can only be uttered by the rational () would seem to commit the Stoics to the view that children are unable to convey meaning in speech. There are also illuminating moments, such as the parallel between the Stoics' account of their architect god and Vitruvius' definition of the ideal architect (). Other readers will no doubt come up with their own lists of quibbles and illuminations. But anyone interested in Hellenistic theology or Cicero the philosopher will want to read this book. The same should apply to people interested in Roman religion, for Wynne's central argument is that these works by Cicero are primarily about how Romans ought to think about their own religious practices and whether the Hellenistic schools of philosophy can help them out in this task. Appendices set out Stoic religious terminology in Greek and Latin sources, Epicurean arguments against the theological views of previous philosophers, and a Stoic classification of the gods, all adding to the thoroughness of Wynne's study.

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