According to evidentialism, a belief is propositionally justified just in case it fits (is supported by) one's evidence. A fully developed evidentialist theory of justification will require an account of the evidential fit (support) relation. Some evidentialists have embraced an explanationist account of this relation. Some of these accounts, such as Kevin McCain's, place an awareness requirement on evidential fit. That is, they claim that a proposition, p, fits a subject's evidence, e, only if the subject is (potentially) aware of the explanatory connection between p and e. I argue by way of example that this version of explanationism fails. As a result, I suggest a friendly revision of explanationism that excludes an awareness condition. Finally, I field some objections to my version of explanationism.According to evidentialism, a belief is propositionally justified just in case it fits (is supported by) one's evidence. A fully developed evidentialist theory of justification will require an account of the evidential fit (support) relation. Some evidentialists, such as Feldman (2008) andMcCain (2013;2014;2015;2017;2018) have embraced an explanationist account of this relation. Some of these accounts, particularly McCain's, place an awareness requirement on evidential fit. That is, they claim that a proposition, p, fits a subject's evidence, e, only if the subject is (potentially) aware of the explanatory connection between p and e. I argue against this claim. First, I explicate recent explanationist accounts of fit offered by both Conee and Feldman (2008) and McCain (2014; 2015). Next, I argue that McCain's most recent must be refined in order to escape (slightly modified versions of) extant counterexamples in the literature.Third, I argue by way of example that, nonetheless, this version of explanationism fails, since it mistakenly claims that one must be aware of the explanatory connection between one's evidence and a proposition in order for the latter to fit one's evidence. As a result, I suggest a friendly revision of explanationism that excludes an awareness condition. Finally, I field some objections to my version of explanationism. IntroductionBefore turning to an examination of Feldman's (2008) andMcCain's (2014;2015) explanationist proposals, it should be noted that the accounts discussed in this section, since they are offered in an evidentialist context, also double as accounts of propositional justification. The reason is that evidentialists say that propositional justification supervenes on evidential fit. 1 Actually, for the purpose of this discussion, we should simply assume that a proposition p fits evidence e just in case e propositionally justifies p. Hence, it should be clear that our focus here is propositional, rather than doxastic justification (I will consider the latter in section 4). Conee and Feldman's (2008) account of the evidential fit relation is as follows:Best Explanation (BE): p fits S's evidence, e, at t iff p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has...

Pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an agent believes that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite the fact that their public behavior is identical. I argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational. I accomplish this, first, by rebutting a recent argument for the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Next, I offer a defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Third, I examine a type of case in which the pluralistically ignorant agent's belief is irrational, despite the fact that this belief lacks a defeater. Finally, I consider instances of pluralistically ignorant agents whose beliefs are not irrational, but explain why such cases are not problematic for my main thesis. This critical discussion allows me to offer an important amendment to an extant account of pluralistic ignorance.