On 29 August 2013 the UK House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a PrimeMinister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders' statements and parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership were most significant. An additional factor -the role of historical precedent -was also important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical development and empirical research.Keywords: foreign policy analysis; decision-making; UK foreign policy; parliaments. 2'A leader humbled, a nation cut down to size ' (Rachman 2013 This was an unusual case of a parliament defying a PM's preference on a decision to deploy military force. This vote was unprecedented in UK politics and challenges conventional wisdom that Westminster has little influence in security policy. Yet this case also resembles instances of parliamentary influence elsewhere and the factors that explain this vote are consistent with other cases. After a brief description of the backdrop to the vote, we establish the theoretical context of parliaments' role in security policy, setting out the general expectation that parliaments are not particularly influential. At the heart of the article we consider -through a consolidation of previous research -factors that facilitate parliamentary influence in security policy and examine the impact they each had in the Syria vote. In concluding, we use this case to suggest directions for future research. Our aim is to explain this particular vote and to advance research and understanding about the role of parliaments in security policy. We ground our analysis of parliamentary influence in a conceptualisation of political dynamics focusing on group and individual actors from a decision-making perspective. From this wide-ranging research, we consolidate and specify several facilitating factors for parliamentary influence in security policy. They include:• Institutional powers of parliament; 8• Public opinion;• Cabinet type;• Intraparty factions; and• Prime Ministerial (PM) leadership style.These factors can, and often do, act together, but here we present the logic of each separately. Furthermore, none are deterministic; there are caveats to the logic of each of them. Following a comparative, general analysis of factors for parliamentary influence in foreign and security policy, we apply these to the Syria vote.

On 2 November 2014 George Osborne stood in the impressive great council chamber of Manchester town hall and, flanked by the ten leaders of Greater Manchester's local authorities, announced a devolution deal for the city‐region. Greater Manchester would receive a significant package of powers over transport, housing, planning, skills, business support and welfare in exchange for creating new governance structures, including a directly elected mayor for the city‐region. This article explores the background to the Devo Manc deal, arguing that it is the product of both a long history of local government collaboration in Greater Manchester and George Osborne's desire for a sweeping restructure of English governance. It traces how the key decisions were taken quickly and by a small number of key officials. The article also identifies some flaws in Devo Manc and considers whether it is an appropriate model for other city‐regions in the UK.

This analysis investigates the role of historical analogies in the influence that parliaments have in foreign policy. Our empirical focus is the UK House of Parliament's unusual opposition to the Prime Minister on UK involvement in Syria in 2013. The Parliament's vote challenges many conventional expectations about the role of parliament in security affairs. Important in this vote were lessons learned and strategically used from UK participation in the intervention of Iraq in 2003. We develop this argument theoretically based on research on historical analogies, arguing that parliaments, 'learn' (primarily negative) lessons about past foreign policy events which guide parliamentary preferences and procedures and can enhance parliaments' role in subsequent foreign policy. We contribute to research on analogies by extending the logic to lessons on process. This use of precedents can offer more structurally-oriented perspectives mechanisms that translate critical junctures into reforms in procedures and policy making practices.

The past 15 years have seen an explosion of interest in the scholarship of E.H. Carr. As a founding figure of the realist approach to International Relations, as a philosopher of history and as a historian of the Soviet Union, Carr made important contributions. His work on the post-war political organisation of Europe has been somewhat neglected. While not going so far as to argue for the introduction of ‘another E.H. Carr’ – Carr the European integration theorist – this article argues that Carr’s specific brand of realism has much to say not only about the establishment, but also about the subsequent development, of the European Economic Community. Carr’s realism was, we argue, capable of understanding change in international society. This understanding was grounded in an appreciation of the role of power and morality in international politics and stands in sharp contrast to the emphasis on the structural factors that are prized by neorealists. While Carr’s vision of post-war Europe has not materialised in its entirety, it captures some of the crucial fault lines that animate the European project. Building a bridge between European integration studies and Carr’s realism will provide a fruitful avenue through which classical realism can once again begin to engage with developments in international politics.

This analysis investigates the role of historical analogies in the influence that parliaments have in foreign policy. Our empirical focus is the UK House of Parliament's unusual opposition to the Prime Minister on UK involvement in Syria in 2013. The Parliament's vote challenges many conventional expectations about the role of parliament in security affairs. Important in this vote were lessons learned and strategically used from UK participation in the intervention of Iraq in 2003. We develop this argument theoretically based on research on historical analogies, arguing that parliaments, 'learn' (primarily negative) lessons about past foreign policy events which guide parliamentary preferences and procedures and can enhance parliaments' role in subsequent foreign policy. We contribute to research on analogies by extending the logic to lessons on process. This use of precedents can offer more structurally-oriented perspectives mechanisms that translate critical junctures into reforms in procedures and policy making practices.