No abstract

The authors argue that high self-monitors may be more sensitive to the status implications of social exchange and more effective in managing their exchange relations to elicit conferrals of status than low self-monitors. In a series of studies, they found that high self-monitors were more accurate in perceiving the status dynamics involved both in a set of fictitious exchange relations and in real relationships involving other members of their social group. Further, high self-monitors elevated their social status among their peers by establishing a reputation as a generous exchange partner. Specifically, they were more likely than low self-monitors to be sought out for help and to refrain from asking others for help. This behavior provides one explanation for why high self-monitors acquire elevated status among their peers--they are more attuned to status dynamics in exchange relations and adapt their behavior in ways that elicit status.

Mental state inferences-judgments about what others think, want, and feel-are central to social life. Models of "mind reading" have considered main effects, including social projection and stereotyping, but have not specified the conditions that govern when these tools will be used. This article develops such a model, claiming that when perceivers assume an initial general sense of similarity to a target, they engage in greater projection and less stereotyping. Three studies featuring manipulations of similarity support this claim. Moreover, reaction time results shed light on the mechanisms underlying these effects. The proposed model gives a new view of the mind reader's tool kit and, more generally, raises questions about moderators of stereotyping and projection in social judgment.We are all mind readers. Not the magical sort, but rather the most ordinary, casually and quickly intuiting what the people around us think, want, and feel. A friend delivers an unwanted birthday present to us, and yet we know she meant well. A new colleague gushes with ideas in front of the boss, and we see not just enthusiasm but his self-promoting motives. A potential romantic partner resists our initial overtures, but somehow we sense (whether rightly or not) that a spark of interest may yet be kindled. At least since Heider's (1958) pioneering work on folk concepts such as "want" and "try," social psychologists have known that inferring mental states-reading minds-comes naturally, if somewhat imperfectly, to most adults and drives much of impression formation (e.g

Most models of how perceivers infer the widespread attitudes and qualities of social groups revolve around either the self (social projection, false consensus) or stereotypes (stereotyping). The author suggests people rely on both of these inferential strategies, with perceived general similarity moderating their use, leading to increased levels of projection and decreased levels of stereotyping. Three studies featuring existing individual differences in perceived similarity as well as manipulated perceptions supported the predictions, with similarity yielding increased projection to, and decreased stereotyping of, various in-groups and out-groups. Evidence that projection and stereotyping may serve as inferential alternatives also emerged. The model and accompanying results have implications for research on social comparison and projection, stereotyping and prejudice, and social inference. Do the majority of rural Americans oppose gay marriage? What portion of your neighbors regularly volunteers for community service? Do most adolescent girls prefer movies with heartwrenching redemption to ones with action and violence? The ability of perceivers to gauge the prevalence of such qualities plays an important role in everyday social life. Our choices of public policy, for instance, rely on judgments of the frequency of behavior and attitudes. Our sense of what is normative, or even fashionable, hangs on intuitions about widespread values and preferences. The jokes we tell and the arguments we make are loaded with assumptions about the knowledge and beliefs of those around us. In short, communicating and coordinating with others requires that perceivers make inferences (whether right or wrong) about the prevalent attitudes and attributes of the people and groups around them.

Participants recalled instances when they felt vicariously ashamed or guilty for another’s wrongdoing and rated their appraisals of the event and resulting motivations. The study tested aspects of social association that uniquely predict vicarious shame and guilt. Results suggest that the experience of vicarious shame and vicarious guilt are distinguishable. Vicarious guilt was predicted by one’s perceived interdependence with the wrongdoer (e.g. high interpersonal interaction), an appraisal of control over the event, and a motivation to repair the other person’s wrongdoing. Vicarious shame was predicted by the relevance of the event to a shared social identity with the wrongdoer, an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to distance from the event. Implications for intergroup behavior and emotion are discussed