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Passively managed index funds now hold over 30% of U.S. equity fund assets; this shift raises fundamental questions about monitoring and governance. We show that, relative to active funds, index funds are less effective monitors: (a) they are less likely to vote against firm management on contentious governance issues; (b) there is no evidence they engage effectively publicly or privately; and (c) they promote less board independence and worse pay-performance sensitivity at their portfolio companies. Overall, the rise of index funds decreases the alignment of incentives between beneficial owners and firm management and shifts control from investors to managers.

Using an international sample of 2,113 initial coin offerings (ICOs), we explore the role of disclosure and information intermediaries in the unregulated crypto-tokens market. First, we document substantial cross-sectional variation in the voluntary disclosure practices of ventures seeking to raise

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Using micro-level data, we examine the behavior of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. SRI funds select firms with lower pollution, more board diversity, higher employee satisfaction, and better workplace safety. Yet both in the cross-section and using an exogenous shock to SRI capital, we find SRI funds do not significantly change firm behavior. Moreover, we find little evidence they try to impact firm behavior using shareholder proposals. Our results suggest SRI funds are not greenwashing, but they are impact washing; they invest in a portfolio of firms with better environmental and social conduct, but do not follow through on their promise of impact.