In the contemporary landscape about temporal experience, debates concerning the "hard question" of the experience of the flow-as opposed to debates concerning more qualitative aspects of temporality, such as change, movement, succession and duration-are gaining more and more attention. The overall dialectics can be thought of in terms of a debate between the realists (who take the phenomenology of the flow of time seriously, and propose various account of it) and deflationists (who take our description of temporal phenomenology as "flowy" to be spurious, and propose various explanation of this spuriousness). In this paper we look inside the realist side. We distinguish primitivist realism, according to which the feeling of time flowing is an irreducible sui generis phenomenology, and various forms of reductionist realism, according to which the experience of the flow is ultimately explainable in terms of a more basic phenomenology. We present reasons to be sceptical against the various reductionist proposals.The conclusion is thus disjunctive: either primitivism or deflationism is the correct account of the purported experience of the flow of time.

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The idea that the present moment is in some sense experientially privileged has been used in various arguments from presentness in favour of the existence of an objective present. Roughly speaking, in the literature we find two different approaches. Either by having an experience of something present we are aware of it as present (perceptual presentness), or by having an experience located in the present we are aware of our experience as present (locational presentness). While the various ways of understanding presentness can be used to formulate different arguments in favour of the existence of an objective present, none of them is ultimately tenable. Eventually, our conclusions will suggest that eliminativism is the best attitude towards presentness.