No abstract

No abstract

This report provides estimates of the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States as of January 2007 by period of entry, region and country of origin, state of residence, age and gender. The estimates were obtained using the "residual" methodology employed for estimates of the unauthorized population in 2005 and 2006 (see Hoefer, Rytina and Campbell, 2006; 2007). The unauthorized resident population is the remainder or "residual" after estimates of the legally resident foreign-born population-legal permanent residents (LPRs), asylees, refugees, and nonimmigrants-are subtracted from estimates of the total foreign-born population. Data to estimate the legally resident population were obtained primarily from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) while the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau was the source for estimates of the total foreign-born population. In summary, an estimated 11.8 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States in January 2007 compared to 8.5 million in 2000 (Hoefer, Rytina, and Campbell, 2006). Between 2000 and 2007, the unauthorized population increased 3.3 million; the annual average increase during this period was 470,000. Nearly 4.2 million (35 percent) of the total 11.8 million unauthorized residents in 2007 had entered in 2000 or later. An estimated 7.0 million (59 percent) were from Mexico.

N SEVERAL national legal systems, imprisonment rates appear to be statistically associated over time with indicators of economic change, and yet this association is not mediated, as one might expect, by change in crime rates. In order to solve this riddle, I argue that rates of punishment vary with power elites' perception of, and responses to, critical periods, without respect to changing official crime rates. A change in the level of punishment is brought about through a particular linkage between social structural change -expressed in part by economic indicators -and change in what I have called 'vocabularies of punitive motive' (Mills, 1963;Melossi, 1985aMelossi, , 1990.I also intend to show that this view is consistent with a revised reading of Georg Rusche's emphasis on the concept of 'less eligibility', according to which the modalities and conditions of punishment are dependent on the social structure and particularly on the labor market (Rusche, 1933;Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968;Melossi, 1978Melossi, ,1980. I will then focus on the possible reasons why we can find such an apparently providential consistency of results between the deeds of the criminal and penal justice systems and the presumed wishes of the members of the power elite. In order to do so I will have to go beyond Rusche's economism, and rely instead on a theory emphasizing hegemony and its articulation through vocabularies of punitive motive.We will see how this revised reading of Rusche's theory should be able to Social LEGAL STUDIES (SAGE, London,

No abstract