This paper describes a study programme underway in the upper Perth Road catchment in Dundee to estimate the effect of gross solids and their interaction with the sediment found within a combined sewer network. Gross solids have been collected at three different sites in the study catchment, near its head, at the catchment outfall and at an intermediate site. In conjunction with the study of gross solids, sewer sediment samples were collected and analysed to determine both their chemical and physical characteristics. The study also includes flow sampling (both dry and storm) and gully discharge monitoring. The pool of pollutants information thus collected includes surface derived, foul flow and gross solids pollutant characteristics. The objective of the study programme is to analyse the contribution made from the various inputs and to produce a budget of pollutants within the study sewer system. A description of the field and laboratory work undertaken in the study is described, together with a preliminary assessment of the pollutants budget technique.

This article examines the contribution that Walt Rostow made to the shaping of U.S. military strategy during the second Indochina War. It links Rostow's work as an economic historian with the advice that he dispensed in the field of strategic bombing. In 1964, Rostow explained to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that "Ho [Chi Minh] has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a guerrilla fighter with nothing to lose." Rostow's economic determinism led him to advocate the bombing of North Vietnam more forcefully than any of his civilian colleagues.

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The study of foreign policy and international relations often takes ideas as rigid and fully formed, being assigned to individuals and categories of school without much attention to the processes by which they change calibre and gain or lose traction. David Milne’s politico-intellectual biography of Paul Wolfowitz from 1969 until he took up service in the administration of George W. Bush focuses precisely on the vagaries as well as the consistencies in the evolution of his thought. Many of the shifts and deepening convictions derived, of course, form the experience of observing and implementing US policy in the latter stages of the Vietnam War and thereafter. Milne takes us through the phases of Wolfowitz’s political evolution up to the moment of 9/11, showing that the “War on Terror” cannot simply be attributed to the trauma of that event; there were many existing tributaries that played into the Bush doctrine, and these have not always been given the recognition they deserve.