Abstract. The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetiton is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win-win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.

Horizontal supply chains is the term used when suppliers competing at a particular level of the chain form a coalition to benefit from their cooperation rather than the usual competitive strategies used by them to become part of the supply chain. Such horizontal cooperation among competitors is studied by Wood, using qualitative research methodology, based on case studies done in New Zealand. The term "coopetition" is used in the literature to describe such a cooperative behavior among competitors. In this paper we examine the coopetition phenomenon from a game theoretic perspective and give a model that brings out the equilibria that will lead to optimal participation among the coalition partners. The model considers a set of growers who can choose to form a coopetitive alliance to market their production in some external regions, while competing within the internal regions. By means of a general analytical framework of competition, we show the strategies that could provide solutions, in a coopetitive perspective, for the growers. These solutions offer a win–win outcome for the growers, letting them share the pie fairly within a growth path of games. We determine the proportion of resources they'll use and how the gain will be shared.

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This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy, taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular, we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carfì) to represent a global green economy interaction, among a country c and the rest of the world w. Our game G is a linear parametric (Euclidean) perturbation of the classic Cournot duopoly. In the paper we offer the complete study of the proposed model and in particular a deep examination of its possible coopetitive solutions.