Having outlined a theory of heterogeneous social construction, this article describes the scientific construction of climate change as a global‐scale environmental problem caused by the universal physical properties of greenhouse gases. Critics have noted that this reductionist formulation serves a variety of political purposes, but instrumental and interest‐based critiques of the use of scientific knowledge tend to ignore the ways in which a politics gets built into science at the upstream end. By retracing the history of climate modeling and of several scientific controversies, I unmask the tacit social and epistemic commitments implied by its specific practices. The specific scientific framing of global climate change has reinforced and been reinforced by the technocratic inclinations of global climate management. The social organization of climate change science and its articulation with the political process raise important questions about trust, uncertainty, and expertise. The article concludes with a discussion of the political brittleness of this dominant science‐led and global‐scale formulation of the climate change problem and the need for a more reflexive politics of climate change and of scientific knowledge based on active trust.

Calls for more broad-based, integrated, useful knowledge now abound in the world of global environmental change science. They evidence many scientists’ desire to help humanity confront the momentous biophysical implications of its own actions. But they also reveal a limited conception of social science and virtually ignore the humanities. They thereby endorse a stunted conception of ‘human dimensions’ at a time when the challenges posed by global environmental change are increasing in magnitude, scale and scope. Here, we make the case for a richer conception predicated on broader intellectual engagement and identify some preconditions for its practical fulfilment. Interdisciplinary dialogue, we suggest, should engender plural representations of Earth’s present and future that are reflective of divergent human values and aspirations. In turn, this might insure publics and decision-makers against overly narrow conceptions of what is possible and desirable as they consider the profound questions raised by global environmental change

This paper seeks to clarify what is meant by the ‘social construction of nature’, which has become a crude but common term used to describe very different understandings of nature, knowledge and the world. I distinguish two broad varieties of construction talk in the social sciences: construction-as-refutation and construction-as-philosophical-critique. The first uses the construction metaphor to refute false beliefs about the world and is consistent with orthodox philosophical stances, such as positivism and realism. By contrast, I identify four other, more radical sorts of construction-as-philosophical-critique that use the construction metaphor to question the culture/nature, subject/object and representation/reality dualisms that provide the conventional philosophical foundation for distinguishing true conceptions of nature from false ones. Another source of confusion has been the question of precisely what is meant by the term ‘nature’. Making distinctions among different senses of that term can provide some badly needed clarity in debates about the social construction of nature. It also highlights a broad difference between those for whom the social construction of nature refers to the construction of our concepts of nature and those for whom the construction of nature refers to the process of constructing nature in the physical and material sense. That distinction, in turn, suggests two major, if also somewhat related, points of theoretical contention: first, the epistemological significance of understanding concepts of nature as constructed; second, the philosophical and political implications of arguing that nature is a socially constructed and contingent phenomenon. These are difficult philosophical and political questions, and the variety of constructionisms suggests that it is possible to answer them in a number of different ways.

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