This note examines the distributive calculus of the Australian Labor government in apportioning millions of dollars of constituency-level grants in the weeks preceding the 1990 and 1993 Australian federal elections. While parliamentary systems have long been assumed to stymie constituencylevel electoral effects-given their foundation on party government, caucus discipline, and voter loyalties directed to parties, not candidates-they also create a collective incentive for the party in government to pursue victories in its most marginal seats, including the tactical apportioning of discretionary funds. The results confirm a distinctly parliamentary form of distributive politics dominated by partisan and marginal seats priorities, while the decision-making influence of cabinet members appears sufficient to secure them funds disproportionate to their marginality.

Right‐wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right‐wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right‐wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right‐wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right‐wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.

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