intimately related to, and dependent upon, psychology. Conversely, psychology itself, in his scheme, was and should be susceptible to philosophical analysis. The depth of Wundt's belief in this two-way interdependence between psychology and philosophy was perhaps best illustrated in his (191 3) vehement opposition to the proposed separation of psychology and philosophy in German universities (see Ash, 1980). According to Wundt, neither empirical observation (or experiment) nor rational analysis alone could constitute true, complete science. Neither psychology nor philosophy could fulfill its task withollt the other. In taking this stand, Wundt showed that he was clearly aware of the historical dependence of psychology-even the new experimental psychology-upon the discipline of philosophy. (On the indebtedness of the so-called "new psychology" to philosophy, see Leary, 1978Leary, , 1979Leary, , 1980aLeary, , 1980bLeary, , 1982 To put the point in a word, Wundt was not a "positivist," though he did share with Ernst Mach (and many others) a view of experience as the primary "given" from which the different natural sciences arrive at their respective subject matters by various distinctive modes of abstraction. Although he was cautious in his metaphysical speculation, he did not shrink from the discussion of the nature of his subject matter, which he construed as consciousness, or the mind. Besides formulating a rather dynamic view of the mind as "actuality," he also pointed out the practical (as well as intellectual) necessity for a philosophical doctrine about the relation between mind and body: methodological decisions-i. e., day-to-day empirical procedures-are dependent upon such a doctrine. For himself, he preferred and argued for a psychophysical parallelism, at least on a pragmatic level; ultimately, this parallelism reflected Wundt's double-aspect monism (Blumenthal, 1980;Richards, 1980). Still, the point is that Wundt, the "physiological psychologist," argued on essentially philosophical grounds for an autonomous psychology, i.e., a nonreductionistic psychology; and he saw no other way to argue the point, pro or con.In addition to his belief in the integral relationship between psychology and philosophy-and in addition to his belief that psychologists should continue to address the epistemological, ethical, and ontological issues that had given rise to psychological science in the first place-Wundt held yet another supposition that helped to define his research program. We are referring to the distinction he made between different aspects of mental life, i.e., between those that do and those that do not lend themselves to investigation by experimental methods. His view was that purely experimental methods were appropriate only to a restricted range of mental activities and phenomena. In particular, he excluded from their scope just about all those aspects of mental life that are nowadays classified under the heading of "higher mental functions." These other aspects of mental life could be brought within the...

This is a story about the New Psychologists who strove at the turn of the century to institutionalize a new science and to create a new set of professional roles. More particularly, it is about the rhetorical fabric they wove around the nascent science of psychology. The article focuses, one by one, on different strands of this fabricon (1) what persuaded the first generation of American psychologists to take an interest in the New Psychology; (2) the arguments these aspiring psychologists presented to presidents and trustees to insure that they could pursue their interest within particular institutional settings; (3) the arguments they put forth against the rights of other persons to engage in similar, competing pursuits; (4) the arguments they laid before various administrators, officials, interest groups, and the general public to guarantee continued and even increased support; and (5) the arguments they presented in the form of theories and practices developed between approximately 1880 and 1920. In this way, it attempts to construct a likely story about the establishment of the New Psychology in America.' Timaeus: Do not be surprised, Socrates, if on many matters concerning the gods and the whole world of change we are unable in every respect and on every occasion to render a consistent and accurate account. You must be satisfied if our account is as likely as any, remembering that both I and you who are sitting in judgement on it are merely human, and should not look for anything more than a likely story in such matters.(Plato, ca. 355 B.c.)Skill in speaking results from studied eloquence. It has five parts: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and utterance. Its purpose is persuasion.(Isidore of Seville, ca. 636 A.D.)The first of rhetoric's parts is the wise choice of matter, And clearly the second is proper arrangement of thoughts;The third, a difficult task, demands the use of appropriate language; Memory's fourth-be master of what you would say. Then, fifth, be eloquent; this makes the system perfect.(Walafrid Strabo, ca. 849 A.D.)This article is part of a larger research project begun at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA (1982-1983.

Although it is generally acknowledged that the modern science of psychology was produced in the mid‐nineteenth century by the cross‐fertilization of philosophy and physiology, few historians have tried to specify the exact role of philosophers in the evolution of modern psychology. The purpose of this article is to identify one important line of development from within early‐nineteenth‐century German philosophy toward the conception of psychology as an independent, experimental, and mathematical science. The thesis it proposes is that Immanuel Kant's criticism of the psychological tradition and his articulation of a specific philosophy of science provided the negative and positive foundations upon which Jakob Friedrich Fries, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and Friedrich Eduard Beneke developed the conceptualization of scientific psychology.

Over the past one hundred years psychology has evolved into a major scientific discipline. Nonetheless, psychology is presently in a state of considerable turmoil regarding its proper subject matter and methods. Is psychology a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of the two?What relation should psychology maintain with philosophy? These general questions, currently under debate, were addressed by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern experimental psychology. This article is an attempt to specify Wundt's conceptualization of psychology and to place it in its historical context. Secondarily it also traces certain major developments since the time of Wundt. The conclusion that is reached is that the apparent contemporary “crisis” in psychology is really nothing new and that, in fact, the present condition of psychology does not necessarily constitute a crisis. In its broad outline at least, present‐day psychology reflects the program which Wundt espoused one hundred years ago.

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