Creationism and Authorial Intentionabstract Abstract creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional characters are abstract objects that authors create. I defend this view against criticisms from Stuart Brock that hitherto have not been adequately countered. The discussion sheds light on how the number of fictional characters depends on authorial intention. I conclude also that we should change how we think intentions are connected to artifacts more generally, both abstract and concrete. i. abstract creationismAbstract creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional characters, such as Sherlock Holmes and Harry Potter, are abstract objects that authors create. The view has many proponents (for example, Braun 2005, Kripke 2013, Salmon 1998, Schiffer 1996, and Thomasson 1999. Stuart Brock (2010) presents a case against abstract creationism that hitherto has not been adequately countered. I will explain and rebut his case. The discussion will shed light on how the number of fictional characters depends on authorial intention. I will conclude also that we should change how we think intentions are connected to artifacts more generally, both abstract and concrete.Let us start with background information about abstract creationism. A key advantage of the view is that it is consistent with our intuitions that the following sentences are true:

Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard ''All the Things You Are'' without its original verse. If we accept that musical works genuinely change in these ways, a puzzle arises: why can't I change Bruckner's Eighth Symphony? More generally, why are some individuals in a privileged position when it comes to changing musical works and other artifacts, such as novels, films, and games? I give a view of musical works that helps to answer these questions. Musical works, on this view, are created abstract objects with no parts. The paradigmatic changes that musical works undergo are socially determined normative changes in how they should be performed. Due to contingent social practices, Bruckner, but not I, can change how his symphony should be performed. Were social practices radically different, I would be able to change his symphony. This view extends to abstract artifacts beyond music, including novels, films, words, games, and corporations.

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