We examine how chief executive officer (CEO) narcissism influences the interorganizational imitation of corporate strategy. We theorize that narcissistic CEOs are influenced more by the corporate strategies they experienced on other boards and less by the corporate strategies experienced by other directors. These effects are strengthened if the other firms to which the CEO has interlock ties have high status and if the CEO is powerful. Through longitudinal analyses of Fortune 500 companies’ decisions (from 1997 to 2006) related to the acquisition emphasis of a firm’s growth strategy and the firm’s level of international diversification, we show that narcissistic CEOs are influenced by corporate strategies that they witnessed at other firms much more than other CEOs. In addition, relatively narcissistic CEOs not only strongly resist the influence of other directors’ prior experience but also tend to demonstrate their superiority by adopting corporate strategies that are the opposite of what fellow directors’ prior experience would suggest. Our theory and results highlight how CEO narcissism limits directors’ influence over corporate strategy and influences CEOs’ learning and information processing in making strategic decisions.

No abstract

This study investigates how a fundamental group decision-making bias referred to as group polarization can influence boards' acquisition premium decisions. The theory suggests that when prior premium experience would lead directors on average to support a relatively high premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even higher after discussions; but when directors' prior premium experience would lead them on average to support a relatively low premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even lower after discussions. Results provided strong support for the theory. Moreover, group polarization was reduced by demographic homogeneity among directors and by minority expertise but increased by board influence. This study introduces a fundamental group decision-making bias into governance research and explains how group processes can influence network diffusions.

This article examines how waiting to imitate a product affects the performance of the imitator compared to the innovator. Specifically, we address two research questions. Under what conditions does imitation erode the advantage of the innovator? What strategies of imitators help overcome the innovator's advantage? Our main argument is that the increasing availability of information on the innovator's product increases the imitator's returns to waiting. With this increasing availability of information, imitators' products transition from those that are horizontally differentiated (products are similar in quality but differ in their attributes) to those that are vertically differentiated (products differ in quality). Thus, we hypothesize that shifts in the nature of competition over time from horizontal differentiation to vertical differentiation account for why the innovator's advantage is not preserved. Imitation timing simply reflects the uncertainty inherent in imitation efforts. One such uncertainty is the extent of product differentiation that the imitator can achieve. We develop several hypotheses that elaborate this basic intuition. We obtained detailed data on innovator-imitator competition in the branded drug industry to test the hypotheses. All our hypotheses are supported. The main contribution of the article is in showing that the nature of product differentiation in product categories is endogenous to the imitative entry decisions of firms.