Although the purpose of this chapter is to construct an anatomy of transparency, it is essential to address the triangular relationship between transparency, openness, and surveillance. The first question is whether a clear distinction can be drawn between transparency and openness. The second question concerns the relationship between transparency/openness and surveillance. This chapter examines transparency, focusing on directions and varieties of transparency and how they interact with their habitat and with each other. It distinguishes four directions of transparency and maps its varieties. The chapter also emphasizes the importance of examining the habitats within which transparency operates. Finally, it draws some brief conclusions, stressing the implications of the analysis for the measurement of transparency. The aim is to identify different directions and varieties of transparency in relatively neutral terms. Abstracting from the issue of direction, transparency can be analysed by means of a set of three dichotomies: event transparency versus process transparency; transparency in retrospect versus transparency in real time; and nominal transparency versus effective transparency.

Transparency is a term that has attained quasi-religious significance in debate over governance and institutional design. Today, it is pervasive in the jargon of business governance as well as that of governments and international bodies, and has been used almost to saturation point in all of those domains over the past decade. This chapter maps out some of the different strains and meanings of the term and doctrine. Like many other notions of a quasi-religious nature, transparency is more often preached than practised, more often invoked than defined, and indeed might ironically be said to be mystic in essence, at least to some extent. The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham seems to have been the first to use ‘transparency’ in its modern governance-related sense in English. The chapter also discusses transparency in international governance, transparency in national and sub-national government, and transparency and corporate governance.

Greater fiscal transparency is seen by its advocates as a means of improving economic governance arrangements in ways which, by promoting fiscal stability, will in turn improve the functioning of the government sector and facilitate improvements in the economic environment for the private sector. 'Fiscal transparency' is much acclaimed by policy-makers, not only in the UK Treasury but also by the IMF and OECD. Fiscal transparency can have substance or can just be voguish incantation. This article explores the meaning of fiscal transparency, by examining its structure and evaluating criteria for assessing the degree of fiscal transparency attached to particular sets of circumstances. It explores the link between transparency and accountability, developing the distinction between event and process transparency. Consideration is given to the trade-off between the value of sunlight (to employ an analogy) and the danger of over-exposure. The performance of the United Kingdom against emerging international best practice is examined, with regard to both public expenditure and taxation. By international standards, UK fiscal transparency is high. Nevertheless, there is a major gap between UK rhetoric and practice, indicating a divergence between nominal and effective transparency. This is evidenced by: frequent changes in public expenditure definitions; the non-publication of important analyses; the location of certain liabilities 'off-balance sheet'; and a lack of candour about tax policy.

Fiscal transparency is fundamentally important but difficult to achieve. The conceptualization of transparency has to be more sophisticated than current rhetoric implies. Analytical tools relating to the generic concept of transparency can be applied to public expenditure. Achieving transparency about public expenditure presents challenges that require explicit strategies in the context of what can be very different sets of local conditions. This article identifies the specific meaning of transparency about public expenditure, defined in terms of the four directions of transparency: inwards, outwards, upwards and downwards. It identifies barriers to the effective transparency of public expenditure, characterizing these as intrinsic or constructed. Tackling these barriers, especially those constructed by policy actors, constitutes a route towards more effective transparency, not only about public expenditure itself but about surrogates for it. It is not just quantity that matters: different varieties of transparency will have differential effects on the achievement of public policy objectives. How transparency mechanisms are structured will therefore shape their impact on public policy – on efficiency, on equity and on democratic accountability. Points for practitioners Public expenditure transparency is fundamentally important, but elusive. The difficulty stems from technical complexities and from the political process. Governments that genuinely wish to improve public expenditure transparency must address intrinsic barriers (such as low public understanding of budgeting numbers and their relationship to national accounts) and desist from building constructed barriers (such as misleading spinned numbers and substituting surrogates for direct public expenditure). It is not just the quantity of transparency that matters: different varieties of transparency will have differential effects on the achievement of public policy objectives. How transparency mechanisms are structured will shape their impact on public policy – on efficiency, on equity and on democratic accountability.

In Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects, value for money (VFM) tests and accounting treatment are distinct but related issues. VFM analysis should be concerned with total risk, not just with the sharing of risk, which dominates the accounting treatment decision. A framework is developed for logical thinking about what is meant by``best VFM'' in the context of PFI projects. This involves consideration of the full set of alternatives, not an artificially diminished subset. The credibility of analytical techniques can be tarnished if they are misused to legitimate a predetermined decision. A reduction in construction risk may be a powerful source of VFM gains under PFI, but, under UK accounting regulation, this should not influence the accounting treatment decision. New complications about how VFM should be interpreted arise directly from the process of public sector fragmentation: affordability to the client is not necessarily the same as VFM for the public sector as a whole. Only public auditors, such as the National Audit Office, can gain access to PFI documentation on the conditions necessary for a comprehensive assessment of both accounting treatment and VFM. However, such studies require the kind of theoretical underpinning provided in this article, as otherwise the findings are likely to be ambiguous and hence vulnerable to rebuttal. In particular, VFM judgements must make explicit the basis of comparison on which they rest. T h e E m e rald R ese a rch R eg is te r fo r th is jo u rn a l is a v a ila b le a t http://www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister T h e cu rre n t iss u e a n d fu ll te x t a rch iv e o f th is jo u rn a l is a v a ila b le a t http://www.em eraldinsight.com/0951-3574.htm