Barnett and Block (2008) attack the heart of modern banking by claiming that the practice of borrowing short and lending long is illicit. While their claim of illegitimacy concerning fractional reserve banking can be defended, their justification lacks substance. Their claim is herein strengthened by a legal analysis of deposits and loans based on Huerta de Soto (2006). A combined legal and economic analysis shows that while lending deposits can be regarded as illicit, the maturity mismatching of loans is legitimate contrary to Barnett and Block's claim. No over-issuance of property rights is involved with this practice once the distinction between present and future goods is taken into account. However, while the practice is not illicit per se, it is greatly assisted and developed through the presence of a fractional reserve banking system, and can sometimes breed detrimental effects.

Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 18(2): 179-194, 2011) argue that one cannot distinguish between deposits and loans due to the continuum problem of maturities and because future goods do not exist-both essential characteristics that distinguish deposit from loan contracts. In a similar way but leading to opposite conclusions (Cachanosky, forthcoming) maintains that both maturity mismatching and fractional reserve banking are ethically justified as these contracts are equivalent. We argue herein that the economic and legal differences between genuine deposit and loan contracts are clear. This implies different legal obligations for these contracts, a necessary step in assessing the ethics of both fractional reserve banking and maturity mismatching. While the former is economically, legally, and perhaps most importantly ethically problematic, there are no such troubles with the latter.

How ethical have recent banking practices been? We answer this question via an economic analysis. We assess the two dominant practices of the modern banking systemfractional reserves and maturity transformation -by gauging the respective rights of the relevant parties. By distinguishing the legal and economic differences between deposit and loan contracts we determine that the practice of maturity transformation (in its various guises) is not only ethical, but also serves a positive social function. The foundation of the modern banking system -the holding of fractional reserves against deposits -is, however, problematic from economic, legal and ethical angles. Starting from a microanalysis of money´s function, a reassessment of the current laws concerning the practice is encouraged, with the aim not only to rectify economic irregularities, but also to realign depositors' rights with the obligations of the banking sector.

Informational cascades can be used to augment the existing Austrian business cycle theory. As first-order users of knowledge know the direct causes of a price change, they transmit this knowledge to second-order users through the price system. Banks with direct knowledge of the sources of the fresh liquidity during a credit induced boom have knowledge of the boom's artificial and unsustainable nature. Higher-order users lack this direct knowledge, and hence continue investing largely ignorant of underlying developments. When first-order users of knowledge sense the boom has run its course, they exit the market, sending a strong signal to higher-order knowledge users that the boom has ended -a fragile situation built upon an informational cascade begins collapsing. Simultaneously, the boom is characterized by an influx of capital and knowledge into the financial sector owing to increased profits relative to the real economy stemming from Cantillon effects surrounding the credit injection. As knowledge pertaining to real production has also exited, the bust commences with a misallocated productive structure requiring equilibration to become consistent with consumers' wants. Actions which inhibit this knowledge from returning to the productive structure will unnecessarily lengthen the time to recovery.

Anthony Evans and Steven Horwitz readily admit that their own understanding of monetary theory is imperfect, and do not even "attempt a rebuttal of [our] claims." George Selgin accepts that some of the arguments we put forward in Bagus and Howden (2010) make for "interesting theory". He fails to rebuff our claim that precautionary reserves are unable to constrain credit creation in a fractional reserve free banking system. While calling for us to provide historical evidence to validate the quibbles we put forward, Selgin himself overstates the evidence. He also claims that we have distorted what he has written, and that we use incorrect monetary theory. These allegations are false.