The hallmark of the voluminous growth determinants literature is the absence of a clear‐cut effect of trade on growth. Numerous candidate regressors have been motivated by alternative theories and tested by a multitude of empirical studies, but not one trade regressor has been robustly related to growth. In this paper, we leverage Melitz's (2003) insights regarding sectoral export dynamics and Feenstra and Kee's (2008) approach to productivity and sectoral export diversity to propose a structured approach to trade and growth determinants. Instead of relying on aggregate trade measures as previous studies have done, we examine the diversity of sectoral exports and the development of broad‐based comparative advantage as a potential growth determinant. Controlling for model uncertainty and endogeneity, we find that export diversity serves as a crucial growth determinant for low‐income countries, an effect that weakens with the level of development.

There is a long-held notion in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection (TP) measures are substitutes. Despite this prediction, there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping, safeguard and countervailing duties. Based on recent theoretical advances, I argue in this paper that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing TP measures is instead tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO bound and applied tariffs. Lower tariff overhangs constrain countries to raise their MFN applied rates without legal repercussions, independent of past tariff changes. Using detailed sectoral data for a sample of 30 WTO member countries during the period 1996-2014, I find strong evidence for an inverse link between tariff overhangs and TP activity. This result implies that tariff overhangs and TP measures are substitutes, vindicating the importance of existing tariff commitments as a key determinant of alternative protection instruments.

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A functioning enforcement mechanism is crucial to ensure the continued success of the GATT/ WTO agreements. In this paper, I examine the WTO members' dispute selection decisions to judge the effectiveness of the WTO's enforcement institution, the Dispute Settlement Body. Previous research shows that measures of retaliatory capacity (GDP, trade volumes, export structure) correlate with the incidence of WTO disputes, but fails to account for a number of empirical facts, such as the steady drop in trade quarrels since the early 2000s. To explain the observed dispute pattern, I extend the WTO theory by incorporating a link between endogenous trade policy formation and agreement violation and dispute filing decisions. I show that countries are more likely to engage in trade disputes as complainants or defendants when they have a small "tariff overhang", which represents the difference between bound tariffs (by WTO negotiations) and the actually applied tariffs. Lower tariff overhangs constrain WTO members' policy flexibility to respond to adverse shocks, which I motivate in my model by sectoral productivity adjustments due to decreases in trade costs after successful trade negotiations. Guided by this theoretical framework, I present empirical evidence that tariff overhangs are an essential determinant of the WTO dispute pattern.

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