We consider the extent to which the concept of Social Licence to Operate can be applied in actual practice by considering BP's activities in Georgia, especially the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Southern Caucasus Pipeline projects. We adapt the model originally developed by Thomson and Boutilier, particularly by further elaborating their three underlying concepts: legitimacy, credibility and trust. We discuss BP's activities in relation to each of these concepts to determine: (1) whether the adapted model can provide practical and useful results in assessing the SLO of project proponents; and (2) if it is found to be useful, what level of SLO has BP achieved for its projects in Georgia. We conclude that the revised Social Licence framework can be usefully applied and BP has achieved at least an 'acceptance' level from the local community. We also draw lessons from BP's experience that can be utilized elsewhere and in the future.

We explore why having a Social Licence to Operate (SLO) is essential for large projects. We analyse the Khudoni Hydroelectric Power Plant in the Svaneti region of Georgia, which was halted in 2013 after much social protest. We assess why the project lacked a SLO and what lessons can be learnt from this experience. Using the Thomson and Boutilier model of SLO as our analytical framework, we elaborate its key elementslegitimacy, credibility and trustin the context of dam and hydropower projects and assess where the Khudoni project failed. We conclude that the project lacked legitimacy, with local communities not seeing any social justification for the project. The credibility of the project and proponent was weak amongst the local population, and trust was absent at all phases of the project. We conclude that the concept of social licence to operate has the potential to encourage project proponents to consider and implement activities which will lead to better outcomes for all parties. We believe there is a strong business case for companies to take the concept seriously. Improving social performance will assist projects in gaining a social licence to operate and grow.

The paper analyses the concept of social licence to operate from a gender perspective. We examine the challenges associated with obtaining a gender-aware social licence for development assistance organizations working in conservative, traditional rural societies. We argue that during project activities, a development cooperation organization should take into account the contextual situation, especially in conservative societies, to ensure that women also benefit from their activities. Focusing on CARE International's JOIN project in Georgia, we identify six challenges that aid agencies face: cultural protocols and gender roles reinforce and exacerbate women's traditional disadvantage; the existing relationships between women and local authorities limits their opportunities; the limited mobility of women creates additional barriers; there is a gender disparity in access to information and resources; women are exploited as a means to access financial resources; and the outmigration of men means that many women are at risk of increasing vulnerability and may not benefit from development assistance projects.

We examine the applicability of the concept of Social Licence to Operate (SLO) for international humanitarian and development cooperation organizations. We review the relevant literature on SLO and derive criteria that can be applicable to the work of development agencies. We also examine the case of the international NGO, Mercy Corps, in the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, Georgia, specifically its Market Alliances against Poverty project. Using focus groups and key informant interviews, we sought to understand what would constitute an SLO for the local community in the context of a development intervention. Themes that emerged included: transparency and accountability; access to information; the potential benefits and dangers of innovations; the inspirational effect of the presence of an external organization; risks associated with loans and grants; and the reliability of intermediaries. Our results can be utilized by development practitioners and humanitarian organizations as well as academics who want to explore the applicability of SLO in the domain of non-governmental organizations and other non-commercial settings.

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