RESUMOO objetivo deste estudo é discutir o dilema sempre atual enfrentado por firmas formadoras de preços: cooperar tacitamente pelos lucros (conluio) ou competir agressivamente pelo mercado (combate). Um experimento adotado como método de investigação produziu dados primários coletados num Jogo de Empresas (MMG). A análise descritiva, apoiada nos modelos de Atratividade de Indústrias, Análise Microeconômica, Teoria dos Jogos e Análise de Stakeholders, comparou os resultados na cooperação e na competição, mostrou que a competição prejudicou gestores (lucros negativos), governo (menos tributos) e investidores (preço das ações 23% menor). Em contrapartida produziu alguns benefícios não sustentáveis: consumidores compraram 22% mais produtos a preços 10% menores; duplicou o número de centros de distribuição e de vendedores e estes elevaram sua renda (46%); produziu-se 21% mais computadores e 5% mais placas de memória; contratou-se 13% mais operários e investiu-se 63% mais recursos em tecnologia (P&D). Conclui-se que para neutralizar os malefícios da competição e promover crescimento econômico sustentável deve-se buscar formas legais ABSTRACT The dilemma faced by oligopolistic price-taking companies was studied -tacit cooperation profitoriented (collusion) or aggressive price competition market-oriented. The results obtained by an experiment based on a Business Game (MMG) produced raw data from a seven-firm oligopoly studied for four years. The descriptive analysis based on Industry Attractiveness, Microeconomic Analysis, Game Theory, and Stakeholders Analysis showed that competition destroyed value for investors (profits were transformed into losses and company share prices fell 23%) and for the government (less taxes). In contrast, 22% more consumers were able to buy 22% more products 10% cheaper, the number of distribution centers and sales representatives grew twice as much, 21% more computers were produced, 13% more employees were hired, and 63% more investments in technology (R&D). The results suggest that to neutralize the negative effects of competition and promote sustainable economic growth it is suitable for firms to practice legal ways to engage in coopetition and create a) superior attractiveness for the industry, b) social orientation by improving wages, creating and maintaining jobs, along with c) support for the economy's development with better products, higher GDP and taxes, and strengthening consumer wrights.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of institutional changes on business landscapes and companies performance in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach – The authors have developed a multiple empirical strategy, including qualitative and quantitative methods. As a qualitative method, we used business landscapes to describe how clustered firm performance varies across industries. We collected return on equity (ROE) and equity data from Brazilian listed companies in a 24-years range, and compared three different 8-years institutional periods. As a quantitative method, the authors compared variance across periods and developed a panel analysis assuming fixed and random effects models. Findings – The main results indicate that ROE differences among institutional periods in Brazil are relevant, indicating that there is an important institutional effect on performance and the impacts of those institutional effects may be different across industries. The impact of institutional changes seems to be considerable in understanding industry and firm performance. In addition, the improvement of the institutional framework increases the variance of firm performance around the mean. Research limitations/implications – The limitations are related to the sample, classification treatment for missing values and outliers. Practical implications – Managers should consider that institutional settings affect industries in a different manner when developing their strategies. Originality/value – Despite the fact that the importance of industry, firm and time effects has been empirically examined, there is still an empirical gap concerning if and how institutional changes affect industries and the configuration of business landscapes.

Em 1917, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, nas cercanias da Vila de Passchendaele, o General Douglas Haig planejou um ataque contra as forças alemãs. Realizou extenso trabalho de planejamento e motivação de sua equipe e iniciou a ofensiva. Como resultado, em apenas três meses, levou 70 mil soldados à morte e deixou outros 250 mil feridos. Casos como esse, classificado por Winston Churchill como "um desesperado gasto de