Diversification is the greatest survival strategy available to hospital pharmacy today. Nuclear pharmacy is a growing field within institutional pharmacy practice and can help ensure the profession's participation in new technologies and clinical support roles. Nuclear pharmacy practice parallels hospital pharmacy practice in many areas including procurement, compounding, dispensing, quality assessment, and drug use review. Particularly important to the practice of pharmacy are the clinical contributions by nuclear pharmacists in areas such as product selection, drug interactions and interferences, and assisting the physician in the interpretation of nuclear medicine imaging data. Hospital-based nuclear pharmacy services are closely allied with nuclear medicine and radiology, which have felt the effects of changing trends in third party reimbursement. It has been shown repeatedly that nuclear pharmacists can make an impact on the quality of nuclear medicine services, while improving the cost effectiveness of these services. For the past several years, only a few hospital pharmacies have made attempts to provide services to nuclear medicine or radiology departments. Pharmacy has a professional responsibility and obligation to become involved with the use of legend drugs routinely used (or soon to be introduced) within these departments. Nuclear pharmacy is an area in the hospital where pharmacy can make a solid financial impact and broaden its scope of recognition and value.

This work deals principally with the fate of Venice and Venetia during the first twenty years of the so-called second Austrian domination. It begins by providing background to the period, by examining the fall of the Venetian Republic in 1797, and its early experiences of foreign domination during the Napoleonic era. It then focuses on the nature of Habsburg rule during the reign of Francis I. Challenging longstanding assumptions about the supposedly repressive and exploitative and nature of Austrian control, it highlights the difficulties faced by the authorities in balancing the needs of Venetia with wider considerations of imperial policy, and in particular the tensions generated by the retention of significant elements of the Napoleonic machinery of government established during the period 1806-1814. The central aim of the book is to move away from the traditional Risorgimento historiography, which focuses on unrest, to explain why Venetia was perhaps the most politically passive area in Europe in the two decades after the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire. The final section of the book examines the developments that took place in the period after Francis I's death in 1835, which permitted the outbreak of revolution in 1848.

The history of the Habsburg Empire in the post-Napoleonic era is frequently approached from the perspective of its various component nationalities. These were traditionally portrayed in the historiography as engaged in more-or-less open struggle with control from Vienna. This article argues that the over-privileging of such national categories can distort the picture. By looking at a number of case studies – the naming of Lombardy-Venetia, the Biblioteca italiana, the Panteon veneto – the relationship between Venice (and its Terraferma) and Habsburg rule during the second Austrian domination is examined. It will be argued that it is more profitable to see Venetian identities (municipal, local, Italian, and as part of a wider transnational European culture) as capable of working for as well as against the empire, and that Habsburg policy was as often concerned with managing potential local rivalries (notably between Lombards and Venetians) as with controlling a perceived Italian threat. It is also suggested that, while cultivation of local identity was often used to reinforce the national, the Austrian authorities were also happy to annex both to further imperial interests.

In the aftermath of the 1848-9 revolutions, even amongst those political commentators most deeply sympathetic to the cause of Italian unification, it remained a commonplace to decry not only the politically fragmented nature of the peninsula but the deep internal divisions within the Italian people. Thus, for example, the French historian François-Tommy Perrens, writing in a work completed shortly after New Year 1857, reflected that, Agreement is no more than a dream. Everywhere division rules, between subjects as much as between princes, between one province of city and another, even within the very heart of an individual city. Nothing can be done that requires collective effort. Much has been spoken of federations and leagues, without a single one ever having been formed. In vain has it been desired to unite Rome with Florence, Lombardy with Piedmont, Sicily with Naples; but no one can agree on anything, even on the battle field. […] These suspicions, these universal jealousies have made Italy fail in favourable circumstances that perhaps will not be seen again for many years.L'accord n'est qu'une vague aspiration. Partout règne la division, et entre les sujets comme entre les princes, d'une province d'une ville à l'autre et jusqu'au sein d'une même cité. Rien ne s'y fait de ce qui demande des efforts collectifs. On a beaucoup parlé de fédérations et de ligues sans en former une seule. Vainement on a voulu réunir Rome à Florence, la Lombardie au Piémont, Venise à la Lombardie, la Sicile à Naples ; on n'a pu marcher d'accord nulle part, pas même sur les champs de bataille … Ces défiances, ces jalousies universelles ont fait échouer l'Italie dans des circonstances favorables qui ne renouvelleront pas de longtemps peut-être. 1 At first glance it might appear as though Perrens spoke too soon: four years after the publication of his book, the new Kingdom of Italy was constituted, albeit without Venetia and Rome, which would not be acquired until 1866 and 1870 respectively. Yet despite the formation of a united, constitutional monarchy, under the rule of House of Savoy, Italy's new rulers, and, indeed, most of those who had played a pivotal rôle in the unlikely process of unification were painfully aware that, while a single Italian state had been created for the first time since the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the overwhelming bulk of the population was at best indifferent, and at worst actively resentful and hostile towards the new political structure. Despite the massive endorsement offered by (heavily rigged) plebiscites, which were held in all the House of Savoy's the newly annexed territories bar Lombardy, it was not possible to avoid the obvious conclusion that for the majority of Italians the process of unification was an alien or fundamentally negative experience. A process of centralisation -in large part a panicked response to widespread public opposition to the new order -was greeted by popular unease; in the south especially resistance took the form of violent unrest and open insurrection, misle...

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