Supported by scientific modes of representation, wildlife-management agencies commonly adopt policies that subordinate nonhuman species and resubstantiate human–nonhuman hierarchies. In this paper I illustrate the inadequacy of current management policies by drawing upon Deleuzian notions of immanence and movement and applying them to the specific case of Yellowstone bison. Modes of representation that define nonhuman ontology in terms of genetics are shown to be inadequate for they separate essence from experience and facilitate the removal and exclusion of nonhumans. In contrast, a Deleuzian theory of wildlife accentuates the importance of movement, contact, and contingency in the constitution of nonhuman ontology, thus outlining an approach that can also lead to a revision of human–nonhuman relations. In particular, movement provides a physical mechanism to bridge the theoretical gap that separates human from nonhuman, and suggests a means to link together ethical and evolutionary concerns regarding nonhumans. With the distinctions between Deleuzian theory and common wildlife-management practices in mind, the paradigm of sustainability is criticized for prioritizing demographic and genetic stability over spatial transgression, thereby minimizing the developmental capacities of nonhumans and legitimizing existing spatial structures of exclusion and control.

The concept of hybridity has become an influential theoretical tool for examining and reconsidering relations between society and nature. Although benefits have accrued from this school of thought, this paper contends the deployment of hybridity within the geographic discipline falls short of its reconstitutional claims. These shortcomings are a consequence of the original sources used to develop the language and logic of hybridity. Although the concept of hybridity has a long history in the biological sciences, the utilisation of hybridity in the geographic discipline has predominantly relied upon evolving theories developed in science and technology studies. This paper indicates how Haraway’s cyborg and Latour’s Middle Kingdom limit the scope of hybridity by portraying humanity as central to hybridity. The pervasive centrality of humans within the literature on hybridity (1) limits the ability of geographers to embrace poststructuralism in its entirety and (2) diminishes the discipline’s claim to credibly represent the (natural) landscape. This paper argues for a thicker hybridity by borrowing from emergent theories in the biological sciences, wherein hybridity is conceived as a common occurrence that frequently takes place outside the direct purview of society. Rather than reifying nature, thick hybridity forces society to embrace environmental uncertainty more than it has heretofore.

Form and formlessness The species Canis familiaris, otherwise known as the domestic dog, includes perhaps the widest range of body types of any single species (Young and Bannasch, 2006). As Bjo« rnerfeldt et al (2008) note:`T he morphological differences between breeds are so large that they easily exceed the differentiation between all species in the Family Canidae, and probably no other vertebrate has comparable phenotypic diversity.'' As a result, there are now more than 400 recognized dog breeds in the world (Parker et al, 2004). In their genetic analysis of poodles, Bjo« rnerfeldt et al (2008) are even more discriminating, contending that breeds are likely to contain genetically divergent subgroups due to selective pressures. Not surprisingly, these morphological and genetic differences are accompanied by a host of behavioral distinctions as well. As Trut et al (2006, page 81) define this relationship:`M orphology constrains the range of behavioral patterns, and behavior regulates and modifies morphological function.'' This intraspecific diversity is primarily due to the long association between humans and dogs and, more importantly, the cultural and economic factors that led to the explosion of new breeds in the 18th and 19th centuries. Though Lee and Kasif (2006) observe that humans share a more recent ancestor with the mouse than with the dog, the intimate human^canine relationship has developed into more intricate forms of interspecific understanding, wherein dogs can`read' cues from humans (Hare et al, 2002). Nevertheless, the morphological and behavioral form of dog breeds is always susceptible to deformation by virtue of the fact that distinct breeds within the species can still commingle, mate, and produce undesired offspring of uncertain stature. Altogether, the social and biological qualities of the species as a whole indicate the malleability (and agency) of dogs, making for a species that is as susceptible to

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