No abstract

Despite decades of experimental social dilemma research, "theoretical integration has proven elusive" (Smithson & Foddy, 1999, p. 14). To advance a theory of decision making in social dilemmas, this article provides a conceptual review of the literature that applies a "logic of appropriateness" (March, 1994) framework. The appropriateness framework suggests that people making decisions ask themselves (explicitly or implicitly), "What does a person like me do in a situation like this? " This question identifies 3 significant factors: recognition and classification of the kind of situation encountered, the identity of the individual making the decision, and the application of rules or heuristics in guiding behavioral choice. In contrast with dominant rational choice models, the appropriateness framework proposed accommodates the inherently social nature of social dilemmas, and the role of rule and heuristic based processing. Implications for the interpretation of past findings and the direction of future research are discussed.

No abstract

The authors would like to thank Bob Cialdini, Rod Kramer, and three anonymous ASQ reviewers for their incredibly insightful comments. The authors also greatly appreciate the efforts of Susan Rees at Northwestern University and Linda Johanson at ASQ in preparing the manuscript and the Kellogg Center for the Study of Ethical Issues in Business for helping to fund this research. 1The term "surveillance and sanctioning system" refers to systems that monitor behavior and link this behavior to outcomes. The abbreviated term, "sanctioning systems," will be used hereafter to refer to such systems except when literature references deem another term more appropriate.Sanctioning Systems Meckling, 1976;Fama, 1980), has as its focus the creation of systems that ensure worker compliance. Monitoring employee behavior is at the heart of these systems, in which surveillance of employee actions, accompanied by sanctions such as money or promotions, is used to reduce potentially destructive behavior (Pfeffer, 1994).Despite the emphasis on surveillance and sanctioning systems found in our organizational theories and the promise of such systems for ensuring cooperation in organizations, there appears to be a growing number of skeptics.1 Pfeffer (1994) provided an insightful look at the counterproductive effects of managerial control systems. Similarly, Walsh and Seward (1990) have argued that inefficiencies in control systems are linked to firm failure. Cialdini (1996) even characterized surveillance systems as one of the three "tumors" that contribute to unethical behavior in organizations. A variety of specific problems have been associated with sanctioning systems. Scholars have argued that these systems send a signal of mistrust to employees, which in turn can lead to resentment, a feeling of distrust toward management, and oppositional relationships (Strickland, 1958;Kruglanski, 1970;Kipnis, 1972; Pfeffer, 1994;Cialdini, 1996). Systems that are seen as controlling behavior, rather than promoting autonomy, have also been argued to produce feelings of increased pressure and tension, decreased creativity, decreased cognitive flexibility, decreased positive emotions, and lower self-esteem (Deci and Ryan, 1987). Perhaps the most frequently discussed downside of sanctions, however, is the effect on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation. With extrinsic motivation, the goal of an individual's behavior is distinct from the behavior itself (Deci and Ryan, 1987), while intrinsic motivation involves pursuit of an activity because there is an inherent satisfaction that is derived from pursuing the activity. The external pressure to perform generated by surveillance and sanctioning systems is asserted to be a detriment to intrinsic motivation because individuals conclude that their behavior is caused by an external force and not by their natural preference for the activity (Deci and Ryan, 1987; Pfeffer, 1994;Cialdini, 1996). For example, Lepper and Greene (1975), found that preschool children who were told that their performance on a set of ...

No abstract