No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

This is the published version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Abstract. We introduce a game theoretical model of stealing interactions. We model the situation as an extensive form game when one individual may attempt to steal a valuable item from another who may in turn defend it. The population is not homogeneous, but rather each individual has a different Resource Holding Potential (RHP). We assume that RHP not only influences the outcome of the potential aggressive contest (the individual with the larger RHP is more likely to win), but that it also influences how an individual values a particular resource. We investigate several valuation scenarios and study the prevalence of aggressive behaviour. We conclude that the relationship between RHP and resource value is crucial, where some cases lead to fights predominantly between pairs of strong individuals, and some between pairs of weak individuals. Other cases lead to no fights with one individual conceding, and the order of strategy selection is crucial, where the individual which picks its strategy first often has an advantage. Permanent repository link

This article compares the degree of personal income tax progressivity in selected states and investigates the determinants of changes in progressivity through time. D. Suits's and N. C. Kakwani's recently proposed summary measures of tax progressivity are estimated and compared for twelve states with comparable income tax systems. Time series estimates are made for a single state, North Carolina. The analysis reveals that there are systematic differences in progressivity among the states and that inflation and real income growth are important determinants of declining state income tax progressivity.It is well established that income tax systems differ considerably among the states. Such differences suggest there may also be important variations in the degree of income tax progressivity among the states. Systematic differences in the degree of progression, however, have not been established. Recently, Daniel Suits ( 1 ~'T1b) and N. C. Kakwani (1977) developed summary measures that are well suited for comparing degrees of tax progressivity and for analyzing changes in progression through time.2 In this article, we use Suits's and a~C~vani's summary ~ measures to-compare state income tak progressivity and to investigate the determinants of progression AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors acknowledge the valuable comments and assistance of Terry G. Seaks, W. James Smith, and Margarita Moncada. We have benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees. We also express appreciation to those numerous individuals in state tax research and statistics offices who aided the study by supplying zssential data. Special thanks are offered to Alan Desin,