▪ Abstract  This literature review asks three questions of the scholarship on the regulatory networks that have so transformed global governance. First, what are these networks good for? We summarize the state of the literature on regulatory races, the fit between networks and the process of globalization, and the crucial role of the revolution in communications in the development of networks, introducing the topics with a brief intellectual history of regulatory network analysis in international relations and international law scholarship. Second, we examine how we can make sure that regulatory networks are good by asking this question: How might necessary and appropriate accountability mechanisms for the networks be constructed? The answers to these questions are at the foundation of a global administrative law, which is itself the subject of a burgeoning scholarly literature. Our third question concerns the way regulatory networks fit into a world where traditional intergovernmental relations and formally constituted international organizations are still important. We conclude by identifying different ways in which networks and international organizations can complement each other and by spotlighting questions for future research.

This article adds an empirical perspective to the debate over the use of foreign authority by federal courts. It surveys 60 years of federal court practice in citing opinions from foreign high courts using a citation count analysis. The data reveal that federal courts rarely cite to foreign decisions, they do so no more now than they did in the past, and on those few occasions where they do cite to foreign decisions, it's usually not to help them interpret domestic law. Instead, the citation of foreign decisions is best understood as a relatively rare phenomenon of judicial dialogue in cases where international issues are squarely presented by the facts. The article examines those few cases where federal courts have cited foreign decisions in some detail, and briefly considers some implications of the limited use of foreign decisions by federal courts.

for comments, as well as the participants in workshops and roundtables at Illinois, Penn, and Texas. Small portions of the Article appeared in the testimony of Steven M. Davidoff before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on January 21, 2008. Thanks also to Brianne Blakey and Nikki Cho for research assistance.

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Being a big bank means the regular payment of huge fines to a number of different regulators, paired with profuse apologies, and promises to do better next time. This article makes use of a hand-collected dataset to show how this enforcement worked in the United States after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. American regulators have tended to hunt the big banks in packs, with multiple regulators pursuing fines against financial institutions for the same misconduct. Regulators frequently enforce in a ‘viral’ manner: once they sanction one bank for a type of misconduct, the chances that they will sanction another bank for the same sort of misconduct increases. Some regulators like to bundle a variety of different unlawful actions by banks into one global settlement. Enforcement by the Department of Justice can result in spectacularly expensive settlements compared to the level of enforcement by primary banking regulatory agencies; overall, Department of Justice sanctions in dollars dwarf those of all other agencies policing part of what a bank does. American enforcement, despite suspicion to the contrary, does not appear to protect domestic banks and discriminate against foreign ones. Although this article’s primary goal is to make sense of the federal government’s overall enforcement practices, one recommendation is made: criminal prosecutors should consult with safety and soundness regulators before unveiling indictments and settlements against banks.