We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less highpowered promotion systems) can both reduce inequality and increase output. Holding promotion contests at the division level rather than the firm level can boost employees' effort. Our results are also consistent with personnel policies that feature egalitarian pay systems and dismissal of worst-performing employees.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate how social comparison and motivation to compete account for elevated risk-taking in fund management corroborated by asset market experiments when performance depends on rank-based incentives.Design/methodology/approachIn two laboratory experiments, university students (n1 = 240/n2 = 120) make choices between risky and certain outcomes of hypothetical sums of money. Both experiments investigate in which direction risky choices in an individual condition (individual risk preference) are shifted when participants compare their performance to another participant's performance (social comparison), being instructed or not to outperform the other (incentive to compete).FindingsIn the absence of incentives to compete, participants tend to minimize the differences between expected outcomes to themselves and to the other, but when provided with incentives to compete, they tend to maximize these differences. An independent additional increase in risk-taking is observed when participants are provided with incentives to compete.Originality/valueOriginal findings include that social comparison does not evoke motivation to compete unless incentives are offered and that increases in risk-taking depend both on what the other chooses and the incentives.