As an important financial means for governments to improve the quality of economic development, government debt greatly affects the quality of local environmental governance. Based on a theoretical mechanism analysis that uses the pollutant emissions panel data and new caliber urban investment bond data of 273 cities in China, this paper empirically tests the impact of local government debt on urban emission reduction and the mechanism that drives this impact. We find that local government debt significantly promotes urban emissions reduction, and as urban pollution becomes more aggravated, this promoting effect has a dynamic path, first strengthening and then weakening. The role of local government debt in promoting urban emission reduction is characterized by both temporal and spatial heterogeneity. A mechanistic analysis shows that local government debt can promote urban emission reduction by promoting urban environmental innovation, with green invention patents demonstrating a stronger intermediary role than green utility model patents.

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The pressure upon local governments to redeem their debt could affect government fiscal ability. It could consequently affect their fiscal policies on corporations, which might distort corporate innovation. Based on the data of Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies and the local government implicit short-term debt financed by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) in 31 provinces, this paper shows that local government debt (LGD) negatively affects corporate R&D investment in China, thereby suggesting a strong crowding-out effect. The crowding-out effect is more pronounced when the firm is a non-state-owned enterprise (NSOE), the firm’s size is small, the firm’s age is young, or the firm is in the lower market competition. This paper provide evidence by interacting the terms that local government actions, such as consumption of fiscal resources, strengthening tax collection efforts, or consumption of credit resources, might partially account for the crowding-out effect. This study illustrates the innovation costs of local government debt.